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ANASTASOFF VERSUS HART: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND
WISDOM OF DENYING PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CIRCUIT
COURT DECISIONS
Michael B. W. Sinclair*
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them.
Unpublished dispositions of this Court are not binding precedent ... [and generally] may
not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit.2
"These rules would not be strangers in totalitarian jurisprudence or in a Franz Kafka
novel."
3
In 1999, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit shook the
jurisprudential world by finding unconstitutional its rule prohibiting reliance
on its unpublished opinions as precedent: Anastasoffv. United States.4 The
opinion by Judge Richard Arnold is thoroughly researched, elegantly written,
and persuasive. Judge Arnold had previously expressed misgivings about the
rule,5 so it was hardly surprising that he should write when the opportunity
presented itself. Like most with an interest in jurisprudence, I read the
opinion with fascination and opened a file-"This is great stuff," I thought,
"but it must be wrong."
Two years later, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, another of the
finest thinkers among our federal appeals court jurists, systematically
disagreed with Judge Arnold in Hart v. Massanari.6 Judge Kozinski's is also
* Professor, New York Law School. My thanks go to Bill Mills for his stimulating discussion of
the subject of this article, his scrutiny of early drafts, and for his intimidating bibliography. I abandon my
intellectual property interest in this article: copy it if you will, in whole or in part, with or without
attribution, but note that the publishers claim copyright in the whole of the issue of which this article is part.
1. Eighth Cir. R. 28A(i).
2. Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
3. Charles E. Carpenter Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of
Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235, 249
(1998). Mr. Carpenter was a member of the ABA Task Force on Unreported Opinions along with three
judges and two other practitioners; thus, he brings to bear the insights of extensive practical experience.
4. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000).
5. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 219 (1999).
6. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). Like Judge Arnold, Judge Kozinski, writing
with Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, had also previously published his position. See Alex Kozinski
&Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions,
CAL. LAw., June 2000, at 43.
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a most impressive opinion, perhaps even more thoroughly researched, tightly
reasoned, and persuasive. It had the benefit, too, of the plethora of academic
commentary following Anastasoff.7 Nevertheless, my reaction to it was
similar: "This is great stuff, but it must be wrong."
Both wrong? How could that be? Well for starters, one's first reactions
to opinions on questions of such moment ought not be taken very seriously.
Perhaps a bit of thought might sort it out, especially aided by some reading in
the voluminous literature soon to be discovered on the topic. But further
thought and investigation left me still uneasy about both sides of the debate.
It does not matter a fig that Anastasoff became moot when the government
conceded.8 The constitutionality' and wisdom of the prohibition and the
underlying issues of the nature of precedent, what justifies it, and its relation
to the duties of a judge remain in play. This article is my attempt to sort out
those issues, focusing on precedent-or stare decisis--and its functions and
justifications. 0 But first by way of introduction, let me sketch the ontogeny,
justifications, and criticisms of selective publication and no-citation rules.
Selective publication of opinions and no-citation rules came into use in
response to the pressing problem of volume; the appellate case load was
increasing very much faster than the number of appellate judges." The
7. "Anastasoff set off a feeding frenzy of scholarship, taking up space in legal journals of every
stripe." Bob Berring, Unprecedented Precedent, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 245,246 (2002). The copious footnotes
to this introduction attest to an already intimidating volume of literature on this subject. But despite being
numerous, the works cited here by no means exhaust the writings on non-publication and no-citation rules.
That means that I shall fail to give credit where it is due at many points; in anticipation, I apologize to those
thus shorted.
8. Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial Power to
"Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 173 (2001) ("Judge Arnold's now-vacated opinion
in Anastasoff raises a fundamental and significant constitutional issue that cannot be ignored.").
9. Some draw a distinction between the two. See, e.g., Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and
Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 30 (1959) (stating precedent
needs a doctrine developed through a line of cases, while stare decisis can use one case alone as authority);
K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of Unpublished
Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 397 (2001) (explaining that stare decisis means "stand by things
decided," while precedent is about bases for decision, and is an "evolving doctrine"); Polly J. Price,
Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 105 (2000) (discussing how stare
decisis is strict and formalistic, while precedent is less so). I shall treat them as synonyms which have
considerable variability in meaning, an aspect that should always be acknowledged.
10. I shall try not to repeat the many deep and insightful arguments that have already been made,
but merely acknowledge and use them where needed.
11. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177 (stating the courts do not "have the resources to write precedential
opinions in every case that comes before them"); Arnold, supra note 5, at 221 ("[Tlhe most serious problem
facing all our courts today: volume."); Boyce F. Martin Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 177, 177-79 (1999); Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of
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problem was the same for all circuit courts of appeals, and the solution of non-
publication is now generally in use, although not always linked to no-citation
rules. 12
The original justification was pragmatic, weighing the burden of opinion
writing on judges against the often small jurisprudential importance of a case.
As almost all who write on this subject repeat, a decision of a court of appeals
and its attendant opinion has two functions: first, to resolve the dispute
between the parties, ideally in such a way as to make even those who do not
prevail content that their position has received proper consideration; second,
to help establish a basis for resolution of similar issues should they arise in the
Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 19 (2000); David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States
Courts ofAppeals, 63 CORNELLL. REV. 128 (1977) (stating dramatic increase in volume of appeals brought
the practice about); Daniel N. Hoffman, Publicity and the Judicial Power, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 343,
346 (2001) (stating that the problem is "an exponential growth in the quantity of law, unmatched by
commensurate growth in the size and staffing resources of the judiciary"); DuVivier, supra note 9, at 398
("[Tlhe Eighth Circuit rule and others like it continue to provide the best solution for how to deal effectively
with heavy caseloads.").
12. For a survey of circuit courts of appeals' rules diminishing the precedential value of unpublished
opinions, see Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 8, at 137 n. 13. Rules imposing absolute prohibitions on citation
are now in the minority. See DuVivier, supra note 9, at 403 (stating although no-citation rules are "now
a minority position in the circuit courts, the no-citation rule is still widely used." citing, e.g., 1 st Cir. R. 36
(2000); 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (2000); 7th Cir. R. 53(e) (2000); 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (2000)). Many writers have
provided fine introductions to the origin and proliferation of non-publication of opinions and no-citation
rules. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1168-72 (1978) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent]; Robert J. Martineau,
Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions. A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
119,121-26 (1994); Price, supra note 9; Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision:
An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 175, 178 (2001); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V.
Chachkes, Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules, 3 J. ApP. PRAC. & PROC. 287, 290-95 (2001);
DuVivier, supra note 9, at 405-10; Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They
Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 760-62 (1995); Joshua R. Mandell, Trees that Fall in the Forest: The
Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1255, 1257-61 (2001). The
literature contains a wealth of statistical data on the extent of the practice. E.g., Michael Hannon, A Closer
Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 199 nn. 1-3
(2001) (containing a remarkable assembly of data); Dunn, supra note 11, at 129-35 (surveying the circuits'
rules at that time); Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 12, at 1173-81, 1207-08
(surveying and tabulating the circuits' rules as of 1978); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An
Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 573, 580-626 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform] (tabulating data on
aspects of selective publication for 1978-79); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion:
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 87 MICH. L. REV.
940 (1989) (reporting on a one year study of Ninth Circuit opinions, both published and unpublished).
Robel's data suggests, inter alia, that concurrences and dissents are at least as likely in unpublished as in
published decisions. Id. at 948.
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
future, that is, to advance the state of the law.' 3 If a decision requires merely
the routine application of precedent and does not make new law or revise or
develop old, then surely relieving the burden on the judges is worth the cost
to jurisprudence of non-publication. The Supreme Court controls the quality
of its opinions and its work load by limiting its docket. The circuit courts of
appeals do not have that power, but they effect the same quality control by
selecting which cases to treat to precedential and published opinions.'
4
Prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions as authority is said to be an
essential concomitant of non-publication, as allowing citation "would frustrate
the very goals of cost and judicial efficiency."' 5 Provided that only routine
decisions remain unpublished, the argument goes, no harm will be done to the
overall system of precedents, and justice in decision-making (as distinguished
from reporting and explaining) need not be compromised. 6 Thus non-
publication also is said to avoid cluttering the published reports with routine
decisions of little jurisprudential consequence, 7 to minimize inconsistency, 8
13. But see Robel, supra note 12, at 941-42 (noting that opinions have functions other than
advancing the state of the law). For example, written opinions are further justified as "forc[ing] judges to
clarify their thinking," Martineau, supra note 12, at 123, and subjecting the grounds of decision to public
evaluation. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 352 (arguing that if harmed by the law, people are entitled to
change laws they think wrong, and for that they must have the grounds of decision. Therefore,
"Courts-especially appellate courts-must give reasons.").
14. This comparison is made by Judge Kozinski. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177. He adds that judges do
not have sufficient time to write publishable opinions for all decisions, id., and quotes Judge Howard T.
Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process: Never Another Learned Hand,
33 S.D. L. REV. 371,379, 384 (1988) (stating that the present appellate judge simply does not have enough
time to engage in "reflective personal craftsmanship"). But see William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275 (1996) [hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari] (pointing out
that with staff screening appeals and deciding whether a summary decision or an oral argument and panel
decision with or without publication, "the circuit courts have become certiorari courts"); see also Robel,
supra note 12, at 953 (discussing how staff make the first and major decisions with respect to subsequent
treatment of an appeal).
15. Martin, supra note 11, at 193 (arguing that without limits on citation "there is virtually no
distinction between published and unpublished"). Martin continues: "[lt will not save us any time if
[unpublished opinions] are being cited back to us. We will have to prepare unpublished opinions as we do
published opinions-as if they were creating precedent." Id. at 196 (quoted in Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178
n.36); see also Carpenter, supra note 3, at 249. Further, "[w]ithout the no-citation rule, a market for
unpublished opinions will develop, thereby hindering judicial efficiency." Id. at 242. See also Reynolds
& Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 12, at 1185 (allowing citation would frustrate the
purpose of non-publication).
16. Dragich, supra note 12, at 789-90 ("[D]evelopment of the law is not impeded when redundant,
straightforward, or unimportant cases are not published.").
17. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting the counter-argument,
"[c]ourts may decide, for one reason or another, that some of their cases are not important enough to take
up pages in a printed report"); DuVivier, supra note 9, at 398-99 ("[lt is helpful for courts to distinguish
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and to improve the quality of the more important decisions for which opinions
are published. 9 No-citation rules have also been said to have the virtues of
protecting those who cannot afford to search unpublished opinions20 and
avoiding further increase in citation of cases of no independent interest2
Yet unpublished opinions have always been obtainable. One could
simply purchase a copy from the clerk of the court, and more recently many,
although not all, can be found in commercial electronic databases, and at each
court's web site.22 This century, West Publishing Company has begun
publishing unpublished opinions in the traditional way, collected and bound
into serial volumes called the FederalAppendix.23 In a sprightly review of the
first year's volumes, Brian P. Brooks finds that not only does this make
nonsense of the fiction of non-publication, but "the Federal Appendix has
something for everyone who questions the traditional justifications for
unpublished opinions: long opinions; controversial opinions; opinions with
dissents; and opinions that are cited as precedent in other opinions, among
others. '24  Brooks notes, "[it] render[s] absurd a fiction that was at least
plausible until recently: the idea that there is something categorically
between those opinions that are potentially more valuable for the analysis of future cases, (i.e. 'published
decisions'), and others that are more routine (i.e. 'unpublished decisions').").
18. "Adding endlessly to the body of precedent-especially binding precedent-can lead to
confusion and unnecessary conflict." Hart, 266 F.3d at 1179; Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential
Precedent, supra note 12, at 1184 (describing the fear that the publication of so many cases would threaten
the cohesion of the law).
19. "Deciding a large portion of our cases in this fashion frees us to spend the requisite time drafting
precedential opinions in the remaining cases." Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178. See also Thomas Sullivan,
Concluding Thoughts on the Practical and Collateral Consequences of Anastasoff, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PRoc. 425,437 (2001) ("The truth is that many unpublished decisions are delivered in opinions that include
neither a careful discussion of facts nor a sophisticated application of the controlling authority on which
the court relied.").
20. Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 12, at 287.
21. "[A]n unpublished opinion will not 'in any way interest persons other than parties to [the
particular] case,' because the opinion neither establishes a new rule of law, modifies an existing rule of law,
applies an existing rule to distinct facts, nor concerns any issue of significant public interest." Williams
v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., dissentingfrom denial ofreh 'g
en banc) (citing 5th Cir. R. 7.5.1).
22. For data on accessibility of unpublished opinions, see William R. Mills, The Shape of the
Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinions on the Process of Legal Research, 46 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
29 (2003); Hannon, supra note 12, at 206 nn.48-50; DuVivier, supra note 9, at 400-02.
23. Citation format: - Fed. Appx. - (xth Cir. 200y).
24. Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions: A Review of the Federal Appendix, 5
GREEN BAG 2d 259, 260 (2002).
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different about unpublished opinions as compared to their precedential
cousins. 25
These simple facts further undermine benefits sometimes attributed to
selective publication. For example, unpublished opinions are said to reduce
the burden on libraries of the growing quantity of reporters and associated
costs, to reduce the costs of publication, and to reduce the burdens on
researchers of greater volumes of data. All such burdens become costs to the
legal system, to be passed to its participants and ultimately to its customers.26
On the critics' side, selective publication and no-citation rules have been
subject to serious doubts. In addition to Judge Arnold's argument that the
concept of judicial power in Article m of the Constitution includes the
restraint of precedent, constitutional arguments have been made on grounds
of due process 7 and equal protection.28 Because the court making the
decision also decides whether to publish, and thus whether to give
precedential effect to its decision,29 critics fear that judges may be tempted to
25. Id. at 263.
26. James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.
J. 1224, 1225 (1975); Carpenter, supra note 3, at 249; Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the
Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 28 (1994)
(discussing the pernicious effect of the tremendous growth of case law on the legal research infrastructure);
Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 12, at 1185 ("[Als volume increases, so
does prolixity and confusion.").
27. Dunn, supra note 11, at 141-45; Weresh, supra note 12, at 193 ("[R]emoving a whole category
of decisions from consideration certainly appears to [deprive litigant the due process of law]."); Jon A.
Strongman, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent and the Fifth Amendment: Why Deny on Unpublished
Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 KAN. L. REV. 195, 196 (2001) (arguing that denying
precedential value to any decision is "a violation of the protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
[D]ue [P]rocess [Cilause").
28. Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of FederalAppellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 405,
414 (1981) (arguing that accessibility of unpublished opinions depends on finance, so "institutional
litigants (especially the government), large urban law firms, and other powerful organizations would thus
receive yet another advantage in the unequal struggle for social justice"); Robel, supra note 12, at 955-59
(institutional access to unpublished opinions exacerbates unfairness). Robel goes on to state that frequent
litigators collect and use unpublished opinions "in making litigation and settlement decisions and in writing
briefs." Id. at 957; see also Weresh, supra note 12, at 195 ("Equal protection considerations are also raised
in the context of the limited publication/restricted citation rules."); Richman & Reynolds, The New
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 275 ("Powerful litigants received greater judicial attention than ... weaker
litigants."); Dunn, supra note 11, at 141-45. Note that the protection ordinarily afforded the poor by rules
of professional ethics that require disclosure of authority would not apply under a no-citation rule denying
authority to an unpublished opinion.
29. Arnold, supra note 5. at 221 ("[R]ule 28(A)(i) says quite plainly, that this principle applies only
when the court wants it to apply."); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh
Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITr. L. REV. 309,313 (1977) (deciding whether to publish, "judges
must determine the future shape of the law itself. It does not seem as obvious that judges are in any position
to do this .... [T]he [no-citation] rule must distort and may even undermine the viability of the common
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use unpublished opinions when they cannot properly distinguish a precedent
or justify a decision, or that judges may not give the issue as much attention
if they do not have to write opinions. ° These concerns may not be mere
speculation; Merritt and Brudney took a census of unpublished labor law
decisions and concluded that their data "raises the very specter described by
the Eighth Circuit: that like cases will be decided in unlike ways, that judges'
opinions will be 'regulated only by their own [personal] opinions.' 3  "Legal
principles will evolve, not in response to the dictates of reason ... [but]
because judges have simply changed their minds."32 Non-publication "may
also tend to conceal the court's position on important questions of law,"33 and
for at least some litigants, loss of a prior holding of a case "as precedent
significantly disadvantages their likelihood of obtaining a favorable holding
on appeal. 34
Perhaps the most serious downside effect of non-publication and no-
citation rules is their potential to create uncertainty. It is now a matter of
course that legal researchers will find and take notice of accessible but
unpublished opinions. Should counsel rely on them in advising a client
prospectively, in planning litigation, or in assessing settlement? A dissent to
a denial of an en banc hearing in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
law."). See also Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the Illinois State Bar Associations Centennial Dinner
9 (Jan. 22, 1977). Justice Stevens said:
[A non-citation rule] assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the quality and importance of his
own work product. If I need authority to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I refer you
to a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief talk in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he did not expect to
be long remembered. Judges are the last persons who should determine which of their decisions
should be long remembered.
Id., reprinted in Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 12, at 1192. But see
Martineau, supra note 12, at 134-37 (arguing it is not difficult, by and large, for judges to know what cases
have precedential value).
30. Arnold, supra note 5, at 223. See Gardner, supra note 26, at 1225 ("Freedom from the pressure
of critical eyes may indeed allow a judge to write his opinions with greater dispatch, but does it not also
create an unwholesome temptation to pay less than meticulous attention to the fine points of an appellant's
argument?"); Hoffman, supra note 11, at 353 (arguing no-citation means "there is no sufficient check,
scrutiny, or accountability"); Sullivan, supra note 19, at 428 ("[N]on-publication may serve to mask
inappropriate personal agendas of appellate judges."); Weresh, supra note 12, at 181 (arguing
accountability reduces the possibility of arbitrariness and tyranny).
31. Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 119 (2001) (quoting Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259)).
32. Id. at 119 (quoting Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905).
33. Sullivan, supra note 19, at 427.
34. Id. at 432; see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 247-48 (summarizing a list of twenty-three negative
properties of no-citation rules).
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gave poignant testimony to the problem. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid
TransiP 5 followed on the heels of an unpublished but known decision:
In Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (unpublished (table), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1062, 120 S. Ct. 615, 145 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1999) a [Fifth Circuit] panel
... affirmed [a decision] "for essentially the reasons stated by the district court in its
comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion"... that "DART is a political subdivision of
the state of Texas, and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
3 6
But in Williams, the Fifth Circuit panel said the opposite, that DART had no
such immunity, based on "well established Fifth Circuit law from 1986.... .""
What is the hapless litigant or attorney, or for that matter a federal district judge or
magistrate judge, to do? The reader should put himself or herself into the shoes of the
attorney for DART. The client is told in May 1999, by a panel of this court in Anderson,
that it is immune, on the basis of a "comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion."
Competent counsel reasonably would have concluded, and advised his or her client, that
it could count on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Then, in March 2000, in the instant
case, a federal district judge, understandably citing and relying on the circuit's decision
in Anderson, holds that "[iut is firmly established that DART is a governmental unit or
instrumentality of the state of Texas." In February 2001, however, a panel, containing
one of the judges who was on the Anderson panel, reverses and tells DART that, on the
basis of well-established Fifth Circuit law from 1986, it has no such immunity. One can
only wonder what competent counsel will advise the client now.38
What indeed? But of course legal counselors will rely on unpublished
opinions. What other course could be sensible, or professionally justifiable?
This is especially obvious now that any pretense that non-publication makes
an opinion unavailable has long been abandoned.
All these arguments and more have been thoroughly visited, revisited, and
often countered in the sources cited.39 We must accept that the majority of
35. 256 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curium).
36. Id. at 260 (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).
37. Id. at 261 (Smith, J., dissentingfrom denial of reh'g en banc). The Fifth Circuit rule specifies
that "[u]npublished opinions on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent, except under the doctrine of
res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case ...." Id. (quoting 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).
38. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).
39. For an accessible survey of the problems of no-citation rules, see Mandell, supra note 12, at
1263-72. One cannot, however, leave the list of arguments without remarking the oddity (noticed by many
others). Under a no-citation rule, one may cite treatises, encyclopedias, dictionaries, law reviews,
Restatements, social science research reports, jurisprudes' musings, decisions of other circuits and other
states and even other countries, and of trial courts, and statutes of any level of government, but not 80%
of the decisions of this circuit court of appeals! See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir.
2001).
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decisions of our circuit courts of appeals will continue to be unpublished,4° or
if published, only in a non-opinion format. Present society's enthusiasm for
reduced federal taxes suggests little possibility of action on Judge Arnold's
suggestion that we increase the federal bench sufficiently to make publication
of all opinions possible.4' As Judge Kozinski says, "Congress would have to
increase the number of judges by something like a factor of five to allocate to
each judge a manageable number of opinions each year."42 Nor might we
expect tolerance of judges accepting the burden and litigious societies
accepting ever increasing backlogs.4 3 We have now more than a quarter
century's experience with non-publication; the only change we might
reasonably anticipate is an increase in its use.
I argue that the constitutionality and wisdom of no-citation rules depend
on one's conception of stare decisis. Its operation and grounds are not the
same now as in the founding period; the declaratory theory of common law
and stare decisis of the seventeenth through the early nineteenth centuries was
no longer acceptable by the early twentieth century. Yet Judges Arnold and
Kozinski debate the constitutionality issue primarily on originalist grounds,
that is on the framers' understanding of stare decisis, as best we can
reconstruct it.44 Part I is an outline of the two cases, Anastasoff and Hart,
followed by an assessment of their interaction. It includes explanations of the
declaratory theory on which the originalist conception of judicial power and
its limitation by stare decisis rests, and of why it is no longer viable.
If the theory of the late eighteenth century is no longer the operational
concept of precedent, that aspect of the debate may stand in need of revision.
If we can sort out stare decisis and its justifications, then we should be able
40. Robel, supra note 12, at 960 ("[T]he system we have-at least as it concerns judges-is what
we are likely to have in the future."). "Currently more than 79 percent of federal circuit court opinions are
unpublished." See Hannon, supra note 12, at 201 (providing a wealth of tabulated data on non-publication
and its concomitants).
41. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The remedy, instead, is to
create enough judgeships to handle the volume."); Richman & Reynolds, The New Certiorari, supra note
14, at 297-334.
42. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1179.
43. Anastasoff,.223 F.3d at 904 ("The remedy ... is to create enough judgeships to handle the
volume, or if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each case.
If this means that backlogs grow, the price must still be paid."); see also Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178-79. For
a thorough exploration of the practical consequences of adopting Judge Arnold's thesis, see Lee & Lehnhof,
supra note 8, at 145-51. Lee and Lehnhof explain, "the pragmatic convulsion that would be unleashed on
the slippery slope of Judge Arnold's opinion," arguing that "such a rule would paralyze the federal court
system." Id. at 147.
44. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-05; Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162-69.
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to sort out the limits on reasonable, constitutional non-publication practices
and no-citation rules.45 Part II is about the two dominant conceptions of
common law decision making and stare decisis that have replaced the
declaratory theory, namely, the enactment theory and what I shall call the
standard theory. These are the conceptions manifested by Judges Kozinski
and Arnold (respectively) in their opinions, if not the ones they attribute to the
framers of the Constitution.
This section includes an assessment of the interaction of these theories
with non-publication practices and no-citation rules. The enactment theory
comports with selective publication and no-citation rules, and indeed is a key
element in Judge Kozinski' s argument. I shall argue that although convenient,
the enactment theory is inadequate as an account of legal practice, and thus
gives no comfort to no-citation rules. The standard theory, although more
difficult, is fully adequate as an account of actual reasoning and practice.
However, it makes full precedential status of decisions unavoidable, and is
thus incompatible with no-citation rules. But it is compatible with selective
publication. Thus, the thesis I defend is that the presently accepted model of
stare decisis and its justifications may tolerate non-publication of opinions but
does not allow prohibition of citation of decisions. Elimination of no-citation
rules, however, can be reconciled with the reasons for the developed practice
with a few, relatively easy adjustments to selective publication practice.
In the conclusion, I offer a solution fitted to the dilemma as described in
these terms. The basic justification for selective publication is that routine
decisions merely applying established precedents do notjustify overburdening
judges and the appellate system with full opinions. Yet true non-publication
has not proven possible, and practitioners are inevitably going to rely upon the
supposedly unpublished opinions to which they have access. Accordingly, our
federal circuit courts of appeals should publish all decisions, as precedents,
but in eviscerated form, stating only their conclusions and the cases relied
upon. If a decision cannot be adequately stated in such a form, then it should
be given a full opinion. This solution might not satisfy all enactment theorists,
but it would meet most of the arguments of both proponents and critics of the
present rules and practices.
45. I came across Boggs & Brooks, supra note 11, late in my work on this article, and read it with
heart in mouth. It is well worth reading, written with style as well as insight by a Sixth Circuit judge and
a Washington attorney. They bring practical experience, as well as theoretical sophistication to the matter.
There is indeed some over-lap, with this discussion see id. at 22-25, but not too much.
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I. ANASTASOFF VERSUS HART
Judge Arnold writing for the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and
Judge Kozinski for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached
opposite conclusions as to the constitutionality of their respective circuit's no-
citation rules. The rules are sufficiently similar to suggest that the difference
in outcome does not turn on a difference in rule.46 The key parts of the rules
are:
Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i):
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them.4
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3:
Unpublished dispositions of this Court are not binding precedent... [and generally] may
not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit .... 41
In this section I shall sketch the arguments of each opinion and how they
match up.
A. Anastasoff v. United States
A prior, unpublished case, Christie v. United States,49 had facts
indistinguishable from those of Faye Anastasoff's.
Ms. Anastasoff contends that we are not bound by Christie because it is an unpublished
decision and thus not a precedent under 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i). We disagree. We hold
that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished opinions are not precedent
is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts
a power that goes beyond the "judicial."'
The relevant language in Article Il of the Constitution is: "The judicial
power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."
"Judicial power" is the only relevant expression used, and it is not elaborated
46. Judge Kozinski writes: 'The difference is not material to the rationale of Anastasoff because
both rules free later panels of the court, as well as lower courts within the circuit, to disregard earlier rulings
that are designated as nonprecedential." Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159 n.2. But I shall suggest below one
difference in language that might be consequential. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
47. Eighth Cir. R. 28(A)(i).
48. Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
49. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curium).
50. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
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upon." Thus the federal judiciary has judicial power, no more, no less. What
did the framers understand by that?
The framers thought of stare decisis as "derive[d] from the nature of
judicial power ... "52 So, in using the words in Article Ill, they understood
the doctrine to be implied in and a limitation on the power vested in the
courts. It follows that for a federal court to exercise power unrestrained by the
doctrine of precedent would be to exercise power beyond that with which it
is vested. At the end of the opinion, Judge Arnold nicely and accurately
caricatures Rule 28A(i) and similar rules: "Those courts are saying to the bar:
'We may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but that does
not bind us today, and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did
yesterday."' 53 A rule permitting a court or system of courts to exercise such
unrestrained power would therefore be unconstitutional, and thus the part of
Rule 28A(i) denying precedential power to any decision is unconstitutional.
That is the thesis. In the remainder of the opinion Judge Arnold's task is
to explain and justify it. His explanation and justification are in terms of the
framers' understanding; he reconstructs what they would take as understood
in using the critical words, "judicial power."
Not in question is the practice of selective publication; nor is the
argument about "whether opinions ought to be published."54 In the absence
of an official reporting system, the framers were accustomed to limited and
uncertain publication,55 especially "publication (in the sense of being printed
in a book)."56 Further,
[clourts may decide, for one reason or another, that some of their cases are not important
enough to take up pages in a printed report. Such decisions may be eminently practical
and defensible, but in our view they have nothing to do with the authoritative effect of
any court decisionY
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. One might take a clue from the use of "ordain and establish" for
creating new, inferior courts: "ordain" and "establish" are both words used of churches and religious
offices; perhaps the framers thought of courts and churches as somewhat similar. This is not an argument
taken up by Judge Arnold or anyone else, and probably rightly; one would not want to hang much on it.
52. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
53. Id. at 904.
54. Id. ("[WIhether that means in a book or available in some other accessible form to the general
public.").
55. There was, at the time, little reporting of cases and no official reporting, but that was not seen
"as an impediment to the precedential authority of a judicial decision." Id.
56. Id. at 903.
57. Id. at 904.
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Of course non-publication of a circuit court decision does not mean that it is
unavailable; copies are and have always been available, even though "[y]ou
may have to walk into a clerk's office and pay a per-page fee."58 Denial of
precedential value is the issue here.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent was well
established in the United States and seen as a weapon against the tyranny of
the monarch: Lord Coke's weapon for establishing a judiciary independent
of the crown. So, it was a concept entrenched and revered by the framers,
most of whom had legal training.59 To get at how the framers would have
understood judicial power and its relation to stare decisis, Judge Arnold looks
to the authorities in use at the time, the foremost being Blackstone.6"
According to Blackstone, the power of precedent "derives from the nature of
the judicial power itself." As Blackstone defined it, each exercise of the
"judicial power" requires judges "to determine the law" arising upon the facts
of the case.6'
We now call the theory of common law judging prevailing at that time a
"declaratory theory." There is a law, a natural and God-given law, fixed,
permanent, a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" as Holmes derided it.
62
Judges "are [the depositories] of the laws; the living oracles ' 63 who find the
relevant aspect of that law and apply it to a particular set of facts. Having
done that, "what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, has now
become a permanent rule . . . ."' That decision is binding on later judges
because judges find the law independently of their own opinions; they do not
make it. On this conception, following a prior decision is following the law
there uncovered and declared. "The judicial power to determine law is a
power only to determine what the law is, not to invent it. Because precedents
are the 'best and most authoritative' guide of what that law is, the judicial
58. Id. He does not address differential availability and the possibility of discriminatory effects.
59. Id. at 900-03.
60. Chancellor Kent, a near contemporary of the framers, wrote of Blackstone that he "is justly
placed at the head of all the modem writers who treat of the general elementary principles of law." JAMES
KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 512 (12th ed. 1873). In a footnote Judge Arnold notes the
importance of Blackstone and his "great influence on the Framers' understanding of law." Anastasoff, 223
F.3d at 901 n.8.
61. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *25).
62. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Letter from Oliver W.
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 29, 1926), in HOLMES-LASKILETTERS, 1926-1927, at 822 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1953).
63. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69.
64. Id.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
power is limited by them. ' 65 This was the theory the framers would have
learned, not only from Blackstone, but also from Coke and Sir Matthew
Hale.66
But in addition, Judge Arnold points out, Blackstone saw precedent as
"essential . . . for the separation of legislative and judicial power. '67
Legislatures make law; judges do not have that power. If they did have the
"power to 'depart from' established legal principles, 'the subject would be in
the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only
by their opinions .... "'68
"The Framers accepted this understanding of judicial power... and the
doctrine of precedent implicit in it."'69 There are numerous quotable passages
from writings of our founders and the framers, and Judge Arnold cites and
quotes many of them. Best for his purposes is, of course, Alexander
Hamilton's: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that they should be bound by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them
.... "70 This is a splendid passage for Judge Arnold as it defines the judicial
power in just the manner his thesis needs.
To summarize, in the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent was well-
established in legal practice (despite the absence of a reporting system), regarded as an
immemorial custom, and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty. The duty of
courts to follow their prior decisions was understood to derive from the nature of the
judicial power itself and to separate it from a dangerous union with the legislative power.
The statements of the Framers indicate an understanding and acceptance of these
principles. We conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the doctrine of
precedent limits the "judicial power" delegated to courts in Article III.7
Stare decisis, as the framers saw it, is an inescapable aspect of judicial power;
a purported rule denying it is unconstitutional.
65. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69).
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 31).
68. Id. at *259.
69. Id. at 901-02.
70. Id. at 902 (quoting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, at 507-08, 510; 81 at 531 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Also cited and quoted are James Madison and James Wilson.)). The anti-federalists also believed in
precedent, quoting Brutus. Id. at 903 n. 13.
71. Id. at 903. He then quotes JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 377-78 (1833) for additional support of this account of the framers' understanding.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903.
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B. Hart v. Massanari
Plaintiff-appellant Hart cited a non-published case and so counsel was
ordered "to show cause as to why he should not be disciplined for violating
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. "72 In response, he argued that Anastasoffhad thrown
sufficient doubt on the constitutionality of that rule to permit him to violate
it. Thus, the judge stated, "we write to lay these speculations to rest."73
Judge Kozinski's opinion is rich, diverse, and erudite. Its essential
strategy, however, is quite straightforward. Judge Arnold was correct that the
framers would surely have understood stare decisis in terms of the declaratory
theory ofjudicial decision-making, but he erred as to the nature of the doctrine
under that theory and its consequences to the constitutionality of no-citation
rules. The framers' conception of stare decisis, judging from historical
resources, was of persuasive precedent, not the strict horizontal stare decisis
practiced by panels within our federal circuit courts of appeals or the strict
vertical stare decisis operative in our modern, hierarchical court systems.74
No-citation rules treat unpublished cases as merely persuasive, not as binding
precedent; they thus accord comfortably with treatment of the prior decisions
in the founding era, and with the understanding of the framers (should they
have, indeed, vested the words "judicial power" with the restraining freight of
stare decisis).75 If the original understanding of the framers is determinative
of constitutional meanings, no-citation rules are not unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Hart's counsel had, in citing an unpublished opinion,
violated the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's constitutionally valid
prohibition. However, in light of the doubt cast by Anastasoff and so as not
to punish attorneys who, "in good faith seek to test a rule's constitutionality,"
the panel decided to "exercise its discretion not to impose sanctions."76
Curiously, on Judge Kozinski' s argument both decisions may have been
wrong on the most pedestrian basis: the modal auxiliary verbs of their rules.
72. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1163.
75. This argument was made with great thoroughness and care in Section III of Lee & Lehnhof,
supra note 8, at 153-65, published concurrently with Hart v. Massanari. Lee & Lehnhof point out that
"contrary to Judge Arnold's conclusion, the declaratory notion of common-law decisions aligns itself quite
closely with the status that modem courts accord to unpublished decisions." Id. at 161. "Thus, as
compared to the historical baseline suggested in the Anastasoff opinion, the prevailing circuit rules do not
reduce unpublished opinions to a lower class of precedent, as Judge Arnold supposes; they actually elevate
published opinions to a higher degree of deference." Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
76. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1180.
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The Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) uses the words "[u]npublished opinions are
not precedent" of any kind, but continues with discouragement, not a ban,
"and parties generally should not cite them." Two sentences later, however,
it permits parties to "cite an unpublished opinion if the opinion has persuasive
value on the material issue and no published opinion of this or another court
would serve as well."77 On Judge Kozinski' s reasoning, this permission to cite
unpublished opinions as persuasive is exactly in accord with the framers'
understanding of stare decisis, contra Anastasoff. On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 uses a general prohibition: "Unpublished dispositions
of this Court are not binding precedent... [and generally] may not be cited
to or by the courts of this circuit . . . ." The only exceptions are those
necessary for res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case. If the
Constitution were to require cases at the very least to be persuasive authority,
then this general prohibition would be unconstitutional. Did Hart's counsel
cite Rice v. Chater78 as binding or persuasive? If cited as persuasive, then he
would be constitutionally protected, contra Hart.
C. Originalism
Both protagonists in the Anastasoff versus Hart debate choose as their
ground the interpretive position commonly called "originalism," the
understanding that may be attributed to the framers of our Constitution.
Despite some passionate rhetoric, nobody has privileged access to the specific
intentions of the framers; we work from surviving texts.79 Sometimes those
texts can be quite explicit, but in the interpretation of "judicial power" in
Article Ill, none is unequivocally dispositive. Judicial power and the nature
of precedent do not appear to have been seen by the framers as problematic or
contentious. But in this originalist argument we are interpreting the key
phrase "judicial power" and the nature of precedent through the
understandings of the framers as best we can reconstruct them.
Originalism is not an uncontested interpretive stance for any question of
constitutional interpretation, and not clearly correct or sensible in this case.
Indeed, as Price writes, "[in the absence of solid evidence of specific intent,
77. Eighth Cir. R. 28A(i).
78. No. 95-35604, 1996 WL 583605 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1996); see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1158.
79. Polly J. Price, who, of all the prior commentators I read, wrote most explicitly on the question
of originalism, calls this "moderate originalism": the general understanding, intention, or purpose of the
framers. Price, supra note 9, at 84 (citing Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204-05 (1980)).
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one might argue, a constitutional interpretation that stands solely on
'originalism' is a weak argument for invalidating non-citation rules."8 I do
not intend to enter a debate of the merits or obligation of originalism. But it
does seem to raise difficult conceptual questions in this particular debate.
The problem with adopting originalism here is that it includes the
declaratory theory of common law and precedent. Judges Arnold and
Kozinski both recognize this, but do not seem to see it as problematic.8'
However, it has to be a serious problem to the constitutionality and coherence
of no-citation rules and their denial of precedential value to unpublished
decisions, for it is a theory that few if any jurists, be they of the bench, bar, or
academy, would presently espouse.82 Certainly it does not appear to be the
conception of common law decision-making and stare decisis of either Judge
Arnold or Judge Kozinski. My main argument in this paper is that any
position on the wisdom and constitutionality of the no-citation rules hangs on
one's conception of stare decisis. To attempt to justify a position on a
conception generally abandoned for at least a century would seem at least
anachronistic, if not entirely irrelevant. But before coming to alternative
theories of the judicial power and stare decisis, we should explore the
declaratory theory a little further.
D. The Declaratory Theory
Think of the cosmology current at the time of the founding, the
cosmology that the framers would-at least publicly-have taken for granted.
The universe and the earth and all its populations were created by God
according to a plan. We still subscribe, more or less83 to this today in
80. Id. at 84. Price's thesis is that Judge Arnold in Anastasoff is right, but that you do not need
originalism to make the case. Id. at 83.
81. Judge Kozinski expresses caution about relying on original intent of the framers "lest we freeze
the law into the mold cast in the eighteenth century. The law has changed in many respects since the time
of the Framing, some superficial, others quite fundamental." Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162.
82. Justice Scalia is the only prominent member of the judiciary that I can think of who comes even
close to being a declaratory theorist today. "Between the occasional flashes of humility are long stretches
of and self-righteousness." DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 30 (2002). Scalia's unshakable certainty of
his own rectitude contrasts strongly with Learned Hand's, "[t]he spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not
too sure that it is right." (quoted in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND 549 (1994)). Others who might
count as declaratory theorists are those law and economics theorists who see no further than Kaldor-Hicks'
efficiency (maximize the aggregate wealth of the society) and their Pigouvian perfect market models as
calculators of it.
83. Unless of course one is a devout nouveaux solipsistic post-modern. "In Fishean pomo ("pomo"
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mathematics and the natural sciences. But two hundred to three hundred years
ago most in the Anglo-American legal tradition believed that God also laid
down a moral blueprint.14 That moral blueprint was seen as the supreme law,
"[this law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe,
in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary
to this . . . ."" Judges in common law decisions seek to find and apply this
universal law, deity prescribed. 6
It follows that a common law decision, if accurately down-loaded by the
judge, would dominate any other decision, including a statute, and so it was
in the early days. 7 Lord Coke said in Dr. Bonham's Case:
[I]t appears in our books that in many cases the common law will controul acts of
Parliament and adjudge them to be utterly void. For when an act of Parliament is against
common right or reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law
will controul it and adjudge such act to be void."8
If you find this difficult to swallow, think of an analogy in mathematics: had
the Indiana legislature passed its infamous bill to make Pi equal an even
three, 9 would that have made Pi equal three? If you conceived of societal law
as we do laws of mathematics and the natural sciences, the impossibility of a
= postmodemism; the reference is to Stanley Fish, a leading and outspoken postmodemist), all we have are
competing claims, whether the issue is the numerical value of pi or the assertion that the Mossad destroyed
the World Trade Center." Edward Rothstein, Moral Relativity is a Hot Topic? True. Absolutely., N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2002, at B7.
84. This is still popular today, if survey statistics of religious fundamentalism are anything to go by.
It is not, however, officially receivable as a source of law in the modem secular state.
85. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *41; but see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 661-62 (1999)
(showing Blackstone's position is not presented with complete consistency).
86. See MICHAEL SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 31-32 (2000).
87. R. Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic: A Critique of Judge Richard
Arnold's Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 355, 383 (2001)
("Precedential analysis, according to these judges, expanded the judiciary's power to allow them to void
statutes."). Cf. S.E. Thome, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 U. ILL. L. REV. 202, 207
(1936) (quoting SIR JOHN DAVIES, LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES ET MATTERS EN LEY (1628)).
[Tihe customary law of England, which doe likewise call ius commune, as coming nearest to the
lawe of Nature, which is the root and touchstone of all good lawes, and which also is ius non
scriptum, and written lawes namely our statutes or acts of Parliament.
Id.
88. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Note, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30
(1926-27) (citing The Case of the College of Physicians, commonly called Dr. Bonham's Case, 123 Eng.
Rep. 928, 933 (C.P. 1610)).
89. H.B. 246, 60th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1897).
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legislature's countermanding it would appear the same. Of course legislatures
had power then, as they do now, so they could back their choices with force.
Recognition of this gave us the early concept of legislative supremacy and
also the maxim of construing narrowly statutes in derogation of the common
law.
On the declaratory theory, the aim of a judge should be to find the
blueprint and its proper application; judging on the declaratory theory is
finding and declaring, not making law.9" But since the seventeenth century9'
there has been a clear difference between science and the law: scientists can
use the empirical world to mediate their disputes, and their observations
perforce tend to be pretty much the same.92 The moral law, in contrast, does
not present itself as an objectively observable property of inter-personal
interactions. Different observers may honestly ascribe different moral
predicates to the same action. Only one can be correctly applying the great
blueprint, but how do you tell which?
They must have seen the great blueprint as written at a fairly high level
of abstraction because one should properly find many variations according to
varying circumstances when it was applied to cases. Francis Bacon said it
nicely:
And as veins of water acquire diverse flavors and qualities according to the nature of the
soil through which they flow and percolate, just so in these legal systems natural equity
is tinged and stained by the accidental forms of circumstances, according to the site of
territories, the disposition of peoples, and the nature of commonwealths.
9 3
Blackstone saw this too, and so denied that the common law of England
should apply in "[olur American plantations."9
90. Professor Wesley-Smith points to the reason for the persistence of this notion of law finding
rather than law making: "Judges have good reason to remain attracted to the declaratory theory, if only
because it deflects the charge that decisional law is retrospective and undemocratic and it absolves them
of personal responsibility for what they do. It is still commonplace for judges to talk of a final court's
common law decision as erroneous, as though there were some standard ('the law') standing behind it."
Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT IN LAw 73,
76 (Lawrence Goldstein ed., 1987).
91. At least since the work of Bacon and Galileo in the early 17th century.
92. If you---even if you are a post-modern-and I look at the same thermometer in the same pot of
pure water boiling on the beach fire, you will not see a reading of 150°F while I see 212'F.
93. DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 288 (Stanford Univ. Press 1992).
94. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *107:
[l]t hath been held that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all
the English laws then in being... are immediately in force. But this must be understood with very
many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry with them only so much of the English law
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An accurate answer to a question in litigation may not be simple, given
the difficulty of perceiving the moral blueprint, the relevant details of the
interaction in question, and the factual environment. But past decisions of
similar questions and traditional practice should be a source of reassurance.
Indeed, if a person with expertise had previously visited a similar question, or
many had and had developed a stable solution, that should be followed unless
very compelling reasons indicate otherwise. As Blackstone put it:
The monuments and evidences of our legal customs are contained in the records of the
several courts of justice, in books of reports and judicial decisions, and in the treatises
of learned sages of the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times of
highest antiquity . . . receive their binding power, and force of laws, by' long and
immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom."
Sir Matthew Hale, writing earlier in the eighteenth century, listed "Common
Usage, or Custom, and Practice... [statutes; and] The Judicial Decisions of
Justice, consonant to one another in the Series and Successions of Time."96
As higher courts do today, eighteenth century jurists took an eclectic approach
to sources of authority.
But of all sources, judges in prior cases were the most authoritative. To
Blackstone, judges had, if not perfect vision, a privileged access to the
blueprint underpinning the common law. "[T]he judges in the several courts
of justice ... are the depository of the laws; the living oracles, who must
decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according
to the law of the land."97 Hale was somewhat less mystical, and he gives four
practical reasons, only the second coinciding with Blackstone' s.
as is applicable to their own situation and the condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as
the general rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries. The artificial refinements
and distinctions incident to the property of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and
revenue (such, especially, as are enforced by penalties), the mode of maintenance for the established
clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary
nor convenient for them, and therefore are not in force. What shall be admitted, and what rejected,
at what times, and under what restrictions, must, in case of dispute, be decided in the first instance
by their own provisional judicature, subject to the revision and control of the king in council ....
Our American plantations are principally of the latter sort .... And, therefore, the common law of
England, as such, has no allowance or authority there, they being no part of the mother-country, but
distinct (though dependent) dominions.
Id.
95. Id. at **63-64 (contrasting acts of parliament which do not enjoy such authority).
96. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 44 (Charles M. Gray
ed., U. Chicago Press 1971) (1713).
97. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69.
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First, because judges are chosen for their greater Learning, Knowledge, and Experience
in the Laws than others. 2dly. Because they are upon their Oaths to judge according to
the Laws of the Kingdom. 3dy. Because they have the best Helps to inform their
Judgments. 4thly. Because they do Sedere pro Tribunali, and their Judgments are
strengthened and upheld by the Laws of this Kingdom, till they are by the same Law
revers'd or avoided.98
Thus, if one were to be seeking the common law on a question, one would
be best advised to consult the wisdom of prior judicial decisions.
On the declaratory theory of common law, ajudicial decision is not itself
law,99 but is evidence of law, the best evidence one will find. °° "[lindeed
these judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that
can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the
common law."'0 ' Of course, judges may be arrogant, but it would be heresy
to claim to see the mind of God. Hale is, as always, perspicuously on point:
Judicial Decisions [are binding as law] between the parties thereto [unless reversed on
appeal,] yet [judicial decisions] do not make a Law properly so called, (for that only the
King and Parliament can do); yet they have a great Weight and Authority in Expounding,
Declaring, and Publishing what the law of this Kingdom is, especially when such
Decisions hold a Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former
Times; and tho' such Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a greater Evidence
thereof than the Opinion of any private Persons, as such, whatsoever.' 2
In the new United States, early in the nineteenth century, Chancellor Kent
wrote: "A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case,
becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which
we can have of the law applicable to the subject."' 0 3
Thus, we have stare decisis, the "established rule to abide by former
precedents, where the same points come again in litigation."'" Conceptually
it fit the declaratory theory and its metaphysical underpinnings, but had the
98. HALE, supra note 96, at 45.
99. Kempin, supra note 9, at 33 ("It is doubtless true that the common law was viewed, by the
colonists, as something other than and apart from decided cases.").
100. Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 8 (explaining thoroughly the declaratory theory as espoused by
Blackstone and others of that time, and that it makes decisions merely evidence of the law).
101. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69.
102. HALE, supra note 96, at 45.
103. KENT, supra note 60, at 475.
104. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69.
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practical benefits of stability and certainty, especially for those cases that
needed certainty more than accurate justice.1 5 Yet mistakes could still occur.
Privileged access, optimal working conditions, assistance, and his oath, do
make the oracular judge infallible.
Yet this rule [to abide by precedents] admits of exception, where the former
determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary
to the Divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make
a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.' 
0 6
One can see the natural law orientation here. The prior holding was not "bad
law, but... it was not law .... "' 07 On the declaratory theory, the only way
to vary a prior decision was to find it mistaken. 08
Notice, however, that the power to decide that a prior case was mistaken
did not depend on the status of the court. In England it could not; the
hierarchical structure of the English court system was not firmly in place until
the mid-nineteenth century.0 9 There could be no vertical stare decisis on the
declaratory theory, nor could there be binding precedent. A prior decision was
evidence of common law but not dispositive, and it lay in the power of any
judge at any level to find alternative and in sum, better evidence." 0 Law
finding capacity is independent of status. '" Thus, Plucknett tells us, prior to
the nineteenth century, courts found it relatively easy to avoid unpalatable
precedents. "[I]t was arguable that the precedents did not represent the true
state of the law-a specious argument typical of Coke's mentality." One
105.
[Als well as to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what
before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule which it is not in
the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his own private sentiments:
he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgments, but according to the
known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and
expound an old one.
Id.
106. Id. at *69-70.
107. Id.
108. Wesley-Smith, supra note 90, at 76 (citing HALE, supra note 96, at 45).
109. In this aspect, the United States led England. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 350 (5th ed. 1956).
110. Wesley-Smith, supra note 90, at 78.
111. It is perhaps not surprising that the first exposition of the power of vertical stare decisis occurred
in an ecclesiastical court, part of a religious order thoroughly familiar with hierarchy. Veley and Joslin v.
Burder, 163 Eng. Rep. 127 (Consistory Ct. London 1837).
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could also blame the reporter, "a device often used by Mansfield."' 2 Stare
decisis on the declaratory theory did not-and conceptually could
not-include the binding horizontal precedent practiced within our federal
courts of appeals.
Sir Matthew Hale offers us perhaps the clearest and most succinct
summary of the common law and stare decisis on the declaratory theory.
Cases do not themselves make law; but they do expound, declare, and publish
it, and their doing so is enhanced by congruity with prior decisions. Thus
decisions of cases though "less than a Law," are evidence of law, and as such,
better than the opinions of others outside the judiciary, better than the
opinions of "a bare grave Grammarian or Logician.... ." A prior case need
not be exactly similar-"in Point"-to the one in question if it agrees "in
Reason" or is analogous." 3 That was in 1713; Hale's writings were
voluminous and popular. The framers were as likely to have been familiar
with them as with Blackstone. Blackstone is more woolly but entirely
consistent with Hale: "The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents
and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust: for though their
reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former
times as not to suppose that they acted wholly without consideration."' 4 And
he immediately gives an example where ajudge would follow the established
precedents even though his sympathies ran to the contrary.
The declaratory theory of common law was unquestionably the dominant
theory of the time, and almost certainly the theory in contemplation at the
framing of the Constitution." ' "Inherent in every judicial decision is a
declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. This
declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and
must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties."" 6 This
conception, derided by Holmes as the "brooding omnipresence in the sky,"' 7
would not come under attack until the pioneer positivists of the nineteenth
112. PLUCKNETT, supra note 109, at 349. That England had three systems with concurrent
jurisdiction made it possible also to pick and choose among prior opinions. Id.
113. HALE, supra note 96, at 45-46.
114. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *70.
115. For a detailed study of early American understandings of stare decisis see Lee, supra note 86,
at 662-87.
116. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991)); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 399
(1821).
117. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Letter from Oliver W.
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 29, 1926), in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 62, at 822.
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century, Bentham and Austin. Austin, not always boring, called it "the
childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not
made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing, I
suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the
judges."" 8 It is the conception of precedent on which Judges Arnold and
Kozinski pinned their differences." 9
It is easy to see that this theory is neither viable nor popular today. The
underlying premise of the moral blueprint in the sky, universal and
unalterable, simply does not accord with modem moral understanding or the
democratic political ethic. The most striking practical indicator of
inconsistency with the theory is the hierarchical structure of our court systems
and the strict vertical stare decisis that results. Lower court judges are obliged
to follow the opinions of judges higher in the system; as Lee & Lehnhof point
out, "[a] jurist versed in the declaratory theory would be surprised to learn that
he is foreclosed from setting aside an earlier decision that he finds manifestly
unjust, or contrary to reason or custom."' 20 The converse of vertical stare
decisis, the accepted practice of circuit court judges and Supreme Court
justices treating lower court decisions as merely advisory, is equally out of
accord with the declaratory theory. On the declaratory theory a prior judicial
decision is evidence of the law, no matter what the status of the judge. The
blueprint was consulted and applied to a set of facts; the result can be avoided
only if it is shown to be mistaken. But, if a decision is mistaken, it must be
118. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 634 (London, Robert Campbell ed., 1885).
119. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting Blackstone but acknowledging that the framers learned
this not only from Blackstone, but also from Coke and Hale). The major promise guiding these early
scholars was that decisions are binding on later judges because judges find the law, independently of their
own opinions, they do not make it. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Common law judges did not make law as we understand that concept; rather, they 'found' the law with
the help of earlier cases that had considered similar matters. An opinion was evidence of what the law is,
but it was not an independent source of law."); Price, supra note 9, at 89; in footnote 8 Judge Kozinski
quotes Hale, and Mansfield: "In Lord Mansfield's view, "[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; not the
letter of particular precedents." Hart, 266 F.3d at 1164 n.8 (citing Fisher v. Prince, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876
(K.B. 1762)). "Opinions were merely judges' efforts to ascertain the law, much like scientific experiments
were efforts to ascertain natural laws." Id. at 1164. He also quotes Blackstone. Id. at 1165 (citing
BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at **70-7 1).
120. Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 8, at 165.
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avoided;121 there can be no binding precedent, as authority lies in principles
laid down in the moral blueprint.
122
On the declaratory theory, the difference between published and
unpublished decisions falls by the wayside. Of course it was important to
have records of decisions "carefully registered and preserved" to be referred
to "when any critical question arises, in the determination of which former
precedents may give light or assistance."123 But, judges of that era simply did
not have reliable recording systems, either in England or the new United
States. In the United States during the late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth
century, recording of decisions was "unsystematic, idiosyncratic private
reporting of vastly increased numbers of cases."' 124  This may have been
bothersome, yet on the declaratory theory it was not disastrous; the judge was
looking at the decision as evidence of the law, not at its precise wording as
some sort of rule. "Viewed in this light, the circuit rules' dichotomy between
published and unpublished opinions is difficult to condemn as a constitutional
matter." 125 And in this light, attributing precedential value to only a select few
decisions chosen by their authors makes very little sense. A judge's decision,
following the principles of the common law blueprint as best he can determine
them, is evidence of law even if no opinion sees public distribution. It could
only be otherwise were the judge in dereliction of duty.'26
121. Wesley-Smith, supra note 90, at 78 (quoting Baron Parke in Mirehouse v. Rennell, 6 Eng. Rep.
1015, 1030 (H.L. 1833)). Baron Park stated it would be wrong not "to retract a judgment he was later
convinced was erroneous: 'for none but a weal, nay a wicked mind, will persist in error, if the
understanding and more mature reflection convince a man that he had before formed a wrong judgment."'
Id.
122.
[The law of England would be a strange science indeed if it were decided upon precedents only.
Precedents serve to illustrate principles, and to give them a fixed certainty. But the law of England,
which is exclusive of positive law, enacted by statute, depends upon principles; and these principles
run through all the cases according as the particular circumstances of each have been found to fall
within the one or other of them.
Jones v. Randall, 98 Eng. Rep. 954,955 (1774). There is another report of the case which records the point
thus:
The law would be a strange science if it rested solely upon cases; and if after so large an increase
of commerce, arts and circumstances accruing, we must go to the time of Rich. I to find a case, and
see what is law. Precedent indeed may serve to fix principles, which for certainty's sake are not
suffered to be shaken, whatever might be the weight of the principle, independent of precedent. But
precedent, though it be evidence of law, is not law in itself; much less the whole of law.
Jones v. Randall, 98 Eng. Rep. 706, 707 (1774).
123. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69.
124. Dragich, supra note 12, at 773.
125. Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 8, at 165.
126. That is information a judge would hardly be likely to provide by declaring the decision non-
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What can we conclude at this stage? The declaratory theory of the
common law and stare decisis was surely the conception of the framers, to the
extent they thought of it at all. As Judge Arnold says, it does not permit a
court to consign a selection of decisions to precedential oblivion or
subsequent judges to ignore decisions purportedly thus consigned. Thus the
framer's declaratory theory of the judicial power would not allow Judge
Kozinski's opinion in Hart, that the Constitution condones the Ninth Circuit
Rule 36-3 that courts and counsel may, indeed must, ignore most of their
decisions. But the attention that must be paid to prior decisions is not the
binding precedential power Judge Arnold would attribute to them; it would
not oblige him to follow the unpublished Eighth Circuit decision in Christie
v. United States127 in deciding Anastasoff; it would oblige him to take account
of it, but the Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) permitted that anyway. Thus, the
declaratory theory does not support Anastasoff's finding that Eighth Circuit
Rule 28A(i) was unconstitutional.
But it is strange indeed to allow the matter to rest on a theory so
thoroughly at odds with jurisprudential thought these last hundred or more
years. In this particular matter, even moderate originalism seems thoroughly
out of place. How would we resolve this debate on more acceptable theories
of judicial power and its limitations?
11. THE ENACTMENT THEORY AND THE "STANDARD" THEORY
Stare decisis is a very natural human propensity, not at all peculiar to
judicial decision-making. 2 ' We learn from experience. 2 9 But outside the
courts, one does not have to follow another's course or justify refusing to do
so; 3° although doing so may be prudent, mere prudence hardly defines a legal
precedential.
127. No. 91-2375 MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curium).
128. Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 701 (1952) ("The doctrine of precedent is not an institution peculiar to our common
law. It is in essence a response to the human need in any group for reckonability and predictability of
result.").
129. Kempin, supra note 9, at 29 ("[S]tare decisis is a peculiar and legal adaptation of the common
practice of relying on past experience.").
130. Arnold, supra note 5, at 221 ("A court should not, without very good reasons publicly
acknowledged, depart from past holdings."). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
231 (1995) (O'Conner, J.) ("Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases,
any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.") (quoting Arizona v.
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
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system. 3' To be an institutional constraint on judicial power, stare decisis
must at some time oblige a judge to follow a prior decision when personally
she would rather not; that is, the justification required for deviating must be
publicly adequate, not just personally satisfying.'32
We do not have statutes mandating stare decisis; given the entrenched
status and intrinsic malleability of the doctrine, it is doubtful that it would
make any difference if we did. 133 Nor can a case itself generate the doctrine
as law.'34 The precedential force of the case purporting to establish stare
decisis would itself depend on the rule it announced, a bootstrapping
circularity.' 35 Stare decisis remains, as Justice Frankfurter so famously wrote,
"a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision."' 36 It may be a thoroughly entrenched principle of policy, intrinsic
to our prevailing concept of judicial power, but nevertheless it still stands in
need of justification. If stare decisis cannot be justified then it should be
131. Kempin, supra note 9, at 30 (stating that experience and custom "would be too vague and
irregular to constitute a legal system").
132. This is stronger than Professor Price's "core idea" of stare decisis: 'The core idea of common
law court systems is that what courts have done in the past, to some extent and to some degree, must at least
be considered when a similar case comes along." Price, supra note 9, at 106-07. It is more in accord with
pioneer court reporter William Cranch's view: "[The judge] can not decide a similar case differently,
without strong reasons .. " Price, supra note 9, at 91-92 (quoting 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii-iv (1804) (Preface
by William Cranch)) ("[T]he common law doctrine of stare decisis gives a decided case authoritative force
with respect to future decisions in other cases, whether or not the case is later thought to have been decided
correctly in the light of principle."). See also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITr. L. REV.
1, 24, 25 (1983).
133. While not a statute, one explicit statement of a court's position of stare decisis is The House of
Lords Practice Statement of 1966, 3 All E.R. 77 (H.L. 1966). In The Practice Statement, the House of
Lords proposed "to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as
normally binding to depart from the previous decisions when it appears right to do so." Id. This statement
marked the rejection of the House of Lords' former practice of strictly adhering to precedent, which they
have adopted in 1898. See London St. Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London City Council, [1898] A.C. 375, 381
(H.L.) ("[A] decision of this House on a question of law is conclusive, and ... nothing but an act of
Parliament can set right that which is alleged to be wrong with a judgment of this House."). Professor
Patterson argues the "modification" announced in The Practice Statement was more a recognition of what
in fact had become the practice rather than a real change. ALAN PATTERSON, THE LAW LORDS 143-55
(1982).
134. The announcement of the House of Lords in London Street Tramways, to the contrary
notwithstanding. See [1898] A.C. 375.
135. GLANVILLEL. WILLIAMS, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 187 (1 th ed. 1957).
136. Helvering v. Hullock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). Judge Kozinski emphasizes that stare decisis
is contingent: "The very existence of the binding authority principle is not inevitable. The federal courts
could operate, though much less efficiently, if judges of inferior courts had discretion to consider the
opinions of higher courts, but 'respectfully disagree' with them for good and sufficient reasons." Hart v.
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001).
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abandoned as an unwarranted restraint on freedom,' 37 and itsjustifications will
determine the nature and extent of the constraints it puts on judicial power.
The latter is exactly what is in question in the debate over no-citation rules.
The declaratory theory had its background justification in the moral
blueprint drawn by the white bearded man in the sky, but it is not one on
which courts of our modern secular state can rely. Jurists of that era, however,
were well aware of alternative justifications tuned to societal needs.
Blackstone saw stare decisis as serving the interests of stability, certainty, and
minimizingjudicial discretion. 138 These, along with justice and fairness, 3 9 are
the values commonly presented in its support today. Justice Rehnquist
expressed them succinctly: "Stare decisis is the preferred course because it
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' ' l O Justice Rehnquist also
claimed it was justified by the demands of efficiency: "The obligation to
follow precedent begins with necessity .... [w]ith Cardozo, we recognize that
no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every
case that raised it.'
141
137. For this reason, simply saying that following precedent is what judges and lawyers customarily
do, as a matter of fact, and are socialized into doing, see A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal
Theory, OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 94 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d series 1973), is not adequate.
After all, if what judges do is not justifiable, then it should be changed.
138. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *69.
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in
litigation: as well as keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every
new judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined,
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not
in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he
being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known
laws and customs of the land: not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound
the old one.
Id. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed. 1938) ("[T]o avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them
139. Judge Arnold cites Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987). He
quotes: "Modem legal scholars tend to justify the authority of precedents on equitable or prudential
grounds" i.e., (1) fairness, (2) predictability, (3) to help judges' judging. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 n.7.
But he was drawing a contrast with it as conceived in the Founding era, not establishing grounds for the
modem doctrine.
140. Paynev. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,827 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citingVasquezv. Hillary, 474
U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)).
141. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (Souter, O'Conner,
Kennedy, JJ.) (in the ellipsis: "and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit").
[Vol. 64:695
PRECEDENT AND UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
But the common law and stare decisis142 have only survived over so many
centuries in England and the United States, and through such a variety of
circumstances, because of their great flexibility and adaptivity. 143 Professor
White wrote that "the decisions of appellate courts, upon being issued, are just
beginning their history ...."144 Not only are they followed and distinguished,
they get reshaped, refrained, their foci get moved, their justifications changed
and refurbished, not just by academic commentators but by later judges. It is
as if the original opinion were the photographic negative on which subsequent
critics work to make prints. They may take only a portion of it into a new
frame, they may adjust the intensity of light on different parts, they may give
it a wholly new color; with today's technology they may even pick up, drag,
and drop elements from one part to another, or to nowhere. So too is it with
the original decision. But this very adaptivity depends on an "inherent
corrigibility"; 45 in common law that cuts against socially prized stability. '
46
Lord Mansfield, as adept a manipulator of precedent as Justice Cardozo
would be nearly two hundred years later, expressed both sides with his usual
perspicuity:
In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is
of more consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established
one way or the other. Because speculators in trade then know what ground to go upon.'4'
142. The two are inextricably linked. See Lord Wright, Precedents, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 118, 118
(1943), reprinted in 4 U. TORONTO L.J. 247 (1942); see also EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 2 (First Phoenix ed., 1961); WILLIAMS, supra note 135, at 162.
143. As noted above, this was accommodated under the declaratory theory by having the universal
source law at a conveniently high level of abstraction and incorporating such contextual detail as necessary
to reach a satisfactorily distinct justification. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
144. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 115 (1980).
145. This felicitous term comes from Simpson, supra note 137, at 94.
146. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) ("While bringing to the law
important values such as predictability and consistency, it also (for the very same reason) deprives the law
of flexibility and adaptability."). The court goes on to note that, "[t]he promise of constancy, once given,
binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue
has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete." Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S.
at 868). Note that this text after the "and" is incompatable with the enactment theory. See infra notes
157-60, and accompanying text.
147. Vallejo v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B. 1774). Both Justices Holmes and Brandeis
neglected the limitation to business. Holmes stated, "one of the first things for a court to remember is that
people care more to know that the rules of the game will be stuck to, than to have the best possible rules."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to Franklin Ford (Feb. 8, 1908), reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 201 (1992). Brandeis: "[fln most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule be settled than that it be settled right." Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
[A] statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works
itselfpure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act
of parliament. 1
48
Here is the essential tension underlying the common law and stare decisis. If
stare decisis is meaningful, it must require a court sometimes to make less
than optimal decisions because, and only because, that court or a superior
court has previously decided a similar case in a way that is now less than
ideal. That may provide stability and predictability, but how then is it to adapt
to changing societal needs, to mold itself to the demands of justice?
There is one other great problem for theories of common law and stare
decisis, the requirement of notice. A person cannot be bound by a law of
which he or she has no notice.'49 How could a person follow a rule if she did
not know it? As Jeremy Bentham said: "That a law may be obeyed, it is
necessary that it should be known... that it may be known, it is necessary that
it be promulgated."' 150 Very few people in normal life are able to find cases,
and they ought not have to hire someone to do it for them. Among those with
the necessary expertise, put two on opposite sides of a dispute and they will
come up with different cases, and different interpretations of the cases they
find in common. A major decision, one that we will come to call a landmark,
has no precursors or rejects those it has; thus it will appear, at least to the
losing party and all those who advised their clients otherwise, to be
148. Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 22-23 (Ch. 1744) (alteration in original) (argument of
Mr. Murray, then Solicitor-General of England, later Lord Mansfield). The willingness of courts to drink
from the "fountain of justice" is not always evident. Critics have long bemoaned the reluctance of courts
to react to societal change. Arch-positivist John Austin wrote:
But it is much to be regretted that Judges of capacity, experience and weight, have not seized every
opportunity of introducing a new rule (a rule beneficial for the future) .... [Tihe Judges of the
Common Law Courts would not do what they ought to have done, namely to model their rules of
law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society, instead of stupidly and sulkily adhering
to the old and barbarous usages.
AUSTIN, supra note 118, at 647.
149. JOHN LOCKE, SECONDTREATISEOFCIVILGOVERNMENT § 57 (1690); BLACKSTONE, supra note
31, at **45-46; G.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 138, 215 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942) ("If laws are to
have the binding force that, in view of the right self-consciousness ... they must be made universally
known."); Jeremy Bentham, Of Promulgation of the Laws, 1 WORKS 155 (Bowring ed., 1859); LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 (1964); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
150. Bentham, supra note 149, at 157; see also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-l1:
§§ 90-97: THE TREATISE ON LAW, Question 90, art. 4 (R.J. Heale ed., 1883) ("[Iln order for a law to obtain
the power of obligating which is proper to law, it must be applied to those who are to be directed by it. This
application takes place by being made known to them by promulgation. Therefore promulgation is
necessary for law to have its binding force."); LOCKE, supra note 149, at § 57 (1690) ("[Nlobody can be
under a law which is not promulgated to him.").
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retroactive, temporally preclusive of prior notice.' Any explanation, or
justification of the judicial power and its constraint by stare decisis has to
account for this joint problem of notice and retroactivity.
By mid-nineteenth century the scathing attacks of positivists John Austin
and Jeremy Bentham had taken their toll on the declaratory theory; 152 judges
did not find law, they made it.'5 3 If judges made law, then courts superior in
the hierarchy imposed superior law on inferior courts. The distinction
between vertical and horizontal stare decisis, which made no sense under the
declaratory theory, became operative. Vertical stare decisis could become
strict, the law, not merely persuasive evidence of an underlying universal
moral law;'54 it became the most commonplace and functional aspect of
precedent.'55 Horizontal stare decisis could be as strict or persuasive as the
court saw fit. That it could be strict, as it is within the circuit courts of
appeals today (only changeable by an en banc court or the Supreme Court,
both very rare) further attests to the demise of the declaratory theory.
But how could judges make law? There are two major theories of judicial
decision-making and stare decisis in vogue today, the enactment theory and
what now might be called the "standard" theory. They are not entirely
151. This problem with notice and retroactivity led Bentham to a wonderful metaphor:
Do you know how they make [common law]? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog
does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is
the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and me.
Bentham, supra note 149, vol. V at 235. But retroactive laws have been thought anathema for about as long
as we have records. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legislation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 328
(1996) ("As early as 353 B.C. in Athens, Demosthenes called [a retroactive] statute 'the most disgraceful
and scandalous ever enacted in your assembly."' (quoting DEMOSTHENES AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION,
ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON 383 (J.H. Vince trans., T.E. Page et al. eds., 1935)).
152. AUSTIN, supra note 118, at 634 (arguing the declaratory theory is a "childish fiction employed
by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by
nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges").
153. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9thCir. 2001) ("Lawyers began to believe that judges
made, nor found, the law. This coincided with monumental improvements in the collection and reporting
of case authorities."); Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century,
PRECEDENT IN LAw 68 (Lawrence Goldstein ed., 1987) ("[B]y the 1860s Bentham's term for case law,
'judge-made-law', had become a popular term ... ").
154. Wesley-Smith, supra note 90, at 81 ("When ajudge is recognized, however, as able to make law,
the notion of vertical stare decisis--of a court being bound by decisions of courts above it in the
hierarchy-is perfectly rational. No superior court is infallible when it 'declares' law, but a superior court
can have greater authority than a lower court to 'make' law.").
155. Hart, 266F.3dat 1170 ("A district judge may not respectfully (or disrespectfully) disagree with
his learned colleagues on his own court of appeals who have ruled on a controlling legal issue, or with
Supreme Court Justices writing for a majority of the Court. Binding authority within this regime cannot
be considered and cast aside; it is not merely evidence of what the law is. Rather, caselaw on point is the
law.").
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mutually exclusive, and neither is entirely satisfactory. I shall describe and
evaluate them seriatum and assess their relation to the debate over the no-
citation rules in our federal circuit courts of appeals.
A. The Enactment Theory
The enactment theory holds that judicial decisions (cases) create rules;
there are rules in opinions, of much the same kind as we find in statute books.
As one eminent jurisprude wrote, "[tihis may be called the 'School-rules
concept' of law, and it more or less assimilates all law to statute law." '156 It is
possibly the most common conception of judicial power in law schools today,
as it is the theory behind the "R" ("Rule") in the popular acronym "IRAC,' 57
a formula for planning briefs and examination answers. It is in this sense that
Judge Easterbrook used it when he wrote, "U]udges both resolve disputes and
create rules."' 58
Although a court would not have the opportunity to create the rule had the
dispute not been brought to it for resolution, its decision will not only
instantiate a rule, but will give the rule conceptual priority. The rule crafted
by the court to govern future decision-makers has to be a verbal formulation
of greater generality than a mere recitation of the facts of the case and
"affirmed," or "reversed and remanded," or the like. Making the decision
resolving the dispute is what gives that verbal formula its status and power as
a rule, with power to control subsequent lower court decisions and, on a
federal court of appeals, subsequent coordinate panels.'59
How does this "enactment theory" of common law decision-making
account for stare decisis, the power of precedent? The use of precedents is
thought of as akin to the use of a code: apply the rule of the precedent case to
this dispute and resolve it accordingly. "Judges, when they decide particular
cases at common law, lay down general rules that are intended to benefit the
156. Simpson, supra note 137, at 82.
157. Issue-Rule-Application/analysis/argument--Conclusion.
158. Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term, Forward: The Courts and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1984). The idea was spelled out, perhaps for the first time explicitly, in
Arthur L. Goodheart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161 (1930).
159. We should avoid turning this into a verbal question, making all analysis turn on what is the
meaning of "rule." But some minimal qualities go along with any conception of prescriptive rule, such as
for example being general (i.e., having at least one common noun phrase), being in an identifiable,
canonical verbal formula, having authority independent of the grounds for its enactment, etc. See Michael
Sinclair, What is the 'R' in 'IRAC'?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 459-63 (2003) (outlining a minimal
family resemblance of legal rules).
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community in some way. Other judges, deciding later cases, must therefore
enforce these rules so that the benefit may be achieved."' 60 This is one of the
principal virtues of the enactment theory: it makes the question of stare
decisis redundant. No explanation is needed. The hierarchy of courts
produces a hierarchy of rules, the decision-maker must follow that which
comes from above, and if one is on a federal court of appeals, those that come
from a collegial panel.' 6
The enactment theory also generates stability, predictability, and
reliability. Rules are "evenhanded, predictable, and consistent,"'' 62 and
"foster[] reliance on judicial decisions." '63 What could be more stable and
reliable than authoritative, canonical verbal formulae? Just as statutes are the
same sets of words for all who must follow them, so are the rules enacted in
judicial decisions. They also "contribute[] to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process,"'" 4 "avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts,"' 65 and insure against "the caprice or will of judges."166 Finally, the
enactment theory also accounts for the demands of efficiency, relieving the
judiciary of the burden of considering the factual details and argument of a
precedent case; they must simply apply the rule,just as they would a statute. 167
160. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110 (1977) (Showing hostility towards the
enactment theory; he continues the quoted passage "If this account of the matter were a sufficient
justification of the practices of precedent, then [a judge] could decide these hard common law cases as if
earlier decision were statutes ... [b]ut he will encounter fatal difficulties if he pursues that theory very
far."). See also COLIN MANCHESTER, DAVID SALTER & PETER MOODIE, EXPLORING THE LAW: THE
DYNAMICS OF PRECEDENT AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2000) ("A legal rule established by
the ratio of a case forms a precedent for application in future cases.").
161. Some writers have gone so far as to deny that there is stare decisis in supreme courts, as a
supreme court has the power to overrule its prior decisions, it is not bound by them, therefore they cannot
have created rules for any but junior courts. That is, horizontal stare decisis does not exist. E.g., GLASER,
LIEBERMAN, RUESCHER, SU & MILLS, THE LAWYER'S CRAFT 23 (2002) ("[A]ppellate courts, or so-called
'higher' courts, are not legally bound to adhere to the principle of stare decisis."). See also MANCHESTER,
SALTER & MOODIE, supra note 160, at 3, 4.




165. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1938).
166. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898,903 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting STORY, supra note 71,
at §§ 377-78).
167. This is not to pretend that applying rules is either simple or determinate. The difficulties
associated with statutory interpretation and the burgeoning judicial and academic debate over them should
sufficiently negate any such suggestion.
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The most obvious criticism of the theory is that it simply abandons the
common law's sensitivity to the interests of justice. 168 Rules have the great
virtue of certainty, but they ignore much of the variability and richness of the
natural topology. Common law can be as fact sensitive as a situation calls for;
rules by their generality lump facts into classes, and choose among them
which is to count. 169  This same stability and reduced sensitivity inhibits
adaptation to developing social mores and technology. The rule must remain
fixed, at least until a higher authority-the legislature, higher court, or, for
federal courts of appeals, the circuit en banc-should overrule it.
At least one important theorist, Professor Fred Schauer, has embraced this
eschewing of justice. According to Schauer, common law courts should
forego optimal immediate decisions for the sake of. more general ideals,
expressible as rules. The constraint of precedent, Schauer argues, applies
prospectively as well as retrospectively:' °  "[T]he conscientious
decisionmaker must recognize that future conscientious decisionmakers will
treat her decision as precedent, a realization that will constrain the range of
possible decisions about the case at hand."'' Thus the judge is restrained by
the force of precedent even if there has never been a similar case in the past;
the judge must take into account future cases that might be assimilated under
the description of this one.'72 "The decisionmaker must then decide on the
basis of what is best for all of the cases falling within the appropriate category
of assimilation."' 73 Taking account of all future decisions that are the
potential progeny of this decision can require a less than optimal, less than just
decision in the case at hand.'74
168. See Sinclair, supra note 159 (showing an extensive criticism of the enactment theory).
169. Justice (then ChiefJudge) Scalia wrote: "But the whole point of rulemaking (or of statutory law
as opposed to case-by-case common law development) is to incur a small possibility of inaccuracy in
exchange for a large increase in efficiency and predictability." Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc.
v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
170. Schauer, supra note 139, at 571-78, 589.
171. Id. at 589.
172. Id. at 574 (adding "the many directions in which it may be extended"). This is not as
implausible as it may first appear. Think of the example used by Schauer: "[Flear that allowing restrictions
on Nazis because they are Nazis will establish a precedent for restrictions on socialists because they are
socialists." Id. at 578. As he notes, the example is a reference to the dispute over allowing Nazis to march
in Skokie, Illinois. Id. at 578 n.16.
173. Id. at 589.
174. "[IUn some cases we will make decisions that are worse than optimal for that case taken in
isolation." Id. at 590. What a colossal ego a judge would have to have for this attitude. She would have
to think herself smarter than all those who might meet such questions in the future. Surely parties to present
litigation should not be denied a just decision merely because the judge takes a patronizing attitude to other
and future judges.
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The enactment theory's "rule of the case" also gives us pause as to the
requirement of notice. Certainly in those behavioral domains in which we
seek guidance before acting, such as issuing securities or estate planning, rules
provide the ideal guidance. But these are also typically the behaviors for
which we seek professional guidance before acting. What about most of
ordinary life, the domains governed by tort law and small value contracting?
Ordinary people do not and could not be expected to know of the case rules,
to look them up, or to seek professional advice before going about their
business. Nor would we want them to; society cannot afford it.'75 Are they
at the mercy of secret rules? On the enactment theory they are. Even those
who do take professional advice in planning action but then become party to
a landmark case, effective retroactively, can rightly complain at being
governed by an undiscoverable rule.
The enactment theory must also face the problem of power: where do
judges get the power to make rules? The framers knew how to allocate rule-
making power and did so in Article I, section 1: "All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... ." The courts,
in contrast, were given judicial power.'76 Could judicial power include the
power to make rules, i.e. legislative power? The words are fairly clear,
especially the "[afll legislative power.. ." of Article I, section 1; they rather
preclude their being any allocation of legislative power to the judicial branch.
This is a serious problem for the enactment theory, as a rule to cover cases
beyond that before the court must have common noun phrases and predicates
reaching more general, and thus different cases. But rules governing beyond
the specific are legislative. 77 The separation of powers is a central concept
of our Constitution; the framers saw combining those powers as "the very
definition of tyranny." ' Thus the enactment theory, were it correct, would
175. Lord Mansfield recognized the difference between behavioral domains in which we do take prior
notice of the law and those in which we do not by restricting his predictability goal to "all mercantile
transactions." Vallejo v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012,1017 (K.B. 1774). Holmes and Brandeis, in making
the point without limitation, were overbroad. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48. To be sure,
secondary players in non-notice domains, lawyers and insurers who must settle claims, may wish for certain,
conservative law, but theirs is not the behavior governed. In passing, notice that, in his reason, "[b]ecause
speculators in trade then know what ground to go upon," Mansfield also anticipated Coase. R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
177. This is a distinction Justice Traynor was drawing when he said: "[A] judge invariably takes
precedent as his starting point;... [sitare decisis signifies the basic characteristic of the judicial process
that differentiates it from the legislative process." Roger Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision,
21 ARK. L. REV. 287, 290 (1967).
178. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 347 ("Judicial
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create serious constitutional problems of separation of powers; rule-making
is a legislative function (one should, perhaps, say the legislative function), not
a judicial power.
Judge Kozinski is, in Hart, an avowed enactment theorist: "Writing an
opinion is not simply a matter of laying out the facts and announcing a rule of
decision. Precedential opinions are meant to govern not merely the cases for
which they are written, but future cases as well."' 79 This is not merely
gratuitous theorizing, but part of his reasoning in that case. He continues:
Moreover, the rule must be phrased with precision and with due regard to how it will be
applied in future cases. A judge drafting a precedential opinion must not only consider
the facts of the immediate case, but must also envision the countless permutations of facts
that might arise in the universe of future cases. Modem opinions generally call for the
most precise drafting and re-drafting to ensure that the rule announced sweeps neither too
broadly nor too narrowly, and that it does not collide with other binding precedent that
bears on the issue .... When properly done, it is an exacting and extremely time-
consuming task. 8'
The present case load of the federal circuit courts of appeals makes it
impossible to devote such time, care, and attention to proper selection and
drafting of the rule of decision in all cases.
How do no-citation rules interact with the enactment theory? The no-
citation rules' denial of precedential power to applicable decisions requires
decision-making without rule-making. The theory does not account for that
except when the decision is under a rule already laid down. If the selection
of cases for non-publication is according to the usual criteria, that is merely
routine decisions under established law, then prohibiting citation and the
enactment theory accord very well.' 8 ' In fact, after the rule has been laid
down in the first decision on point, all subsequent applications would do little
for notice, stability, limiting judicial whimsy, or justice. In such cases and
only such cases, the judicial power, exercised by applying a judge-made rule,
does not seem to require publication or precedential attention.
The major difficulty is not with no-citation rules and the Constitution, it
is with the enactment theory itself. It accounts for some of the virtues of
common law and stare decisis, but its inadequacy in respect of notice,
independence and neutrality are the fundamental motivations of Article Mll.").
179. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176(9th Cir. 2001). See also Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra
note 6, at 43.
180. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176-77.
181. It is, however, well established that the limitation of non-publication to the legally routine is
widely flouted. See supra text and accompanying notes 28-30.
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adaptivity, and authority make it difficult to accept seriously. The theory
simply does not account for what we do in practice, be it judicial or advisory
or representational or academic. We do not quote the carefully crafted rule of
the precedent case and argue that it does or does not apply to these facts. 8 2
We compare the facts of different cases, and adopt or reject the judges'
reasoning in them.'83 Even the established common law rules are subject to
various formulations and interpretations, notwithstanding authoritative
precedent decisions.
[I]t is a feature of the common law system that there is no way of settling the correct text
or formulation of the rules, so that it is inherently impossible to state so much as a single
rule in what Pollock called "any authentic form of words." ... [I]f six pundits of the
profession, however sound and distinguished, are asked to write down what they
conceive to be the rule or rules governing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the definition
of murder or manslaughter, the principles governing frustration of contract or mistake as
to the person, it is in the highest degree unlikely that they will fail to write down six
different rules or sets of rules.'84
Nothing similar to a statute or "school rule" can be found in the supposed
rules of judicial decisions.
B. The Standard Theory
In 1992 the Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,8' gave us
a capsule essay on its conception of stare decisis:
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity
marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do
society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it .... Indeed, the
very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable .... At the other
182. Ronald Dworkin refers to "the feature that defeated the enactment theory, which is that the force
of a precedent escapes the language of its opinion .... If an earlier decision were taken to be entirely
justified by some argument of policy, it would have no gravitational force. Its value as a precedent would
be limited to its enactment force, that is, to further cases captured by some particular words of the opinion."
DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 113.
183. Dworkin also stated: "[E]ven important opinions rarely attempt that legislative sort of
draftsmanship. They cite reasons, in the form of precedents and principles, to justify a decision, but it is
the decision, not some new and stated rule of law, that these precedents are taken to justify." Id.
184. Simpson, supra note 137, at 89. See also Boggs & Brooks, supra note 11, at 25 ("Who can
recall the precise language of such seminal cases as Hadley v. Baxendale or Rylands v. Fletcher? And yet
the well-known holdings in those cases are fundamental to the modem lawyer's understanding of contract
law and negligence.").
185. 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
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extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come
to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.
Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter instance,
virtually foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an
"inexorable command," and certainly it is not in every constitutional case .... Rather,
when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether
the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability...; whether
the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation ... ; whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than
a remnant of abandoned doctrine...; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification ... .86
In this passage the Court offers two general justifications for stare
decisis: I"7 (1) Efficiency: The costs to society would be too great were we
to allow every question worth litigating to be litigated afresh every time it
arose; and, (2) Stability and continuity: This puts stare decisis in "the
concept of the rule of law embodied in our own Constitution"; thus it is "by
definition, indispensable." '8 The thought here is that society, not just as a list
of people within a specified territory but as a political community, requires a
continuing stable set of laws; that in turn requires the settling of legal
uncertainties with authority and a degree of permanence. Stare decisis
provides this in the absence of legislation, and where legislated decisions are
under-determinate.
On the other hand, stare decisis does not require the perpetuation of error
or of decisions that have become error. "Error"? Various kinds of
maladaptivity to societal needs, but again it has to be great enough to
overcome the value of stability and continuity. The Court lists four
categories: (1) The precedent simply cannot be implemented, it "def[ies]
practical workability"; (2) If members of society act in reliance on the
precedent, that counts strongly against overruling even if the precedent
appears otherwise morally or socially maladapted, as overruling would "add
186. Id. at 854-55 (citations omitted).
187. Professor Paulsen finds five elements: (1) workability; (2) protecting reliance; (3) "erosion of
a decision's doctrinal foundations by subsequent decisions"; (4) "changed factual circumstances"; and
(5) "the need to preserve public impressions of judicial integrity." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE
L.J. 1535, 1551-67 (2000).
188. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
[Vol. 64:695
PRECEDENT AND UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
inequity to the cost of repudiation."' 9  This would be exemplified by
decisions on which business folk relied in investing. (That, remember, was
the area singled out by Lord Mansfield for certainty's counting more than
justice.); (3) "[W]hether related principles of law have so far developed as to
have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine."'90 This
would likely occur when a well dated precedent had to be revisited. It is
related to the next category, which is about change in the factual background
and the social perception of it: both are about important changes exogenous
to the particular precedential line; and (4) "[W]hether facts have so changed,
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification."'' Common law justifications come from the
world outside the law, outside the precedent line in question. Of course that
exogenous world need not be completely independent of the law: legal
decisions, be they legislative or judicial, can and do influence society in both
behavior and moral evaluation of it. But, nevertheless, the change which
makes overruling reasonable, rational, and sensible occurs outside the legal
decision-making system.
What the Casey majority expressly rejected was endogenous change,
change in the attitudes or composition of the Court itself: "[A] decision to
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a
prior case was wrongly decided." '92 Immediately following this, the opinion
quotes Justice Stewart to the effect that a mere change in membership of the
Court is not a sufficient justification.'93 If we were to allow the overruling of
prior decisions simply on the ground that the present court saw things
differently, thought itself wiser or better informed, then we would indeed
have, in the common law at least, a government of men and not of laws. Thus
it is that "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution
requires such continuity over time that respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable."'
' 94
189. Id. at 855.
190. Justice Kennedy wrote similarly: "We have overruled our precedents when the intervening
development of the law has 'removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,
or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.'
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).
191. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
192. Id. at 864.
193. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
194. Id. at 854.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
In using a precedent we compare its facts to the facts of the case at
hand. 95 But, apart from resjudicata, no two cases are identical; conversely,
every pair of cases is similar in some way. Whether or not a prior decision is
to count as precedent or be distinguishable depends on the choice of criterion
of similarity. The source of criteria of similarity lies in society, exogenous to
the law. In case reports we find it in the reasoning, the ratio decidendi.
Although a prior judge's opinion is inescapably authoritative as to the facts
and outcome, its reasoning, the bill of excuses connecting facts to outcome,
is not.196 When Holmes wrote, "[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men
.. .,,"'" he was referring to societal factors at the time of decision, not factors
recorded in an opinion from the past. 9 8 This gives common law its fitting
balance of stability and adaptivity, geared to the needs of the social domain
in question, and from which its reasons are drawn.'99
So long as reasons, resting in technology as well as social organization
and values, remain rationally valid, so will a line of precedent. But if the
reasoning of a prior case becomes obsolete, the decision itself may remain
viable as precedent under new reasons. An apt example comes from patent
law. A patent requires the invention not to have been previously described in
a "printed publication."2 °° Would a microfilm of a German patent application
on file with the Library of Congress count as a printed publication for this
purpose? In 1958 this question came before the Court of Customs and Patent
195. This account of common law and stare decisis is often called "reasoning by analogy." Larry
Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein 's Legal Reasoning and Political
Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531, 537 (1997) ("Analogical reasoning in law presumably involves
comparing the facts of the case at hand with the facts of various precedent cases in order to determine which
of the precedent cases are relevantly like and unlike the case at hand."). In perhaps the most widely revered
introduction, Professor Levi wrote: "The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example." LEVI,
supra note 142, at 1.
196. "[T]o the common lawyer, it is the decision-not the opinion-that constitutes the law." Boggs
& Brooks, supra note 11, at 17.
197. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
198. Otherwise the first supreme court to meet an issue would settle it forever; common law would
remain static, incapable of adapting to changing times, changing technology, changing morals and values.
199. Today, this is pretty much the accepted theory, the standard model. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-56 (1992); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE
OFTHE COMMON LAW 58-61 (1988); LEVI, supra note 142, at 7-18; Sinclair, supra note 86, at 21-24; Heidi
Li Feldman, Objectivity in Law, 92 U. MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1994); M.B.W. Sinclair, The Semantics of
Common Law Predicates, 61 IND. L.J. 373, 390-95 (1985-86).
200. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Interpreting and applying a common noun phrase-like "printed
publication"-in a statute is a common law process, part of the judicial power.
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Appeals in In re Tenney20' but with a twist: the particular microfilm in
question had been wrongly filed.2°2 That 1958 court decided that it did not
count because a "printed publication" in this context had to be a book, or
journal or the like, requiring some expense to produce and justified by
reasonably wide circulation. The mis-filing of the microfilm was of no
significance to this reasoning. Eight years later, I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco °3
brought the same issue before the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, except that in this case the micro-film was properly filed. On the
reasoning of Tenney the decision was mandated by vertical stare decisis: the
micro-film did not count. But a lot had changed in that eight years. Modern
printing techniques and inter-library communications systems had sufficiently
developed to make Library of Congress micro-films widely available and to
allow them to be the source of a purportedly new advance in the United States
would be a loophole not contemplated by our patent system. So the court
distinguished Tenney on the ground that the micro-film in that case had been
wrongly filed, making it inaccessible to a normal search. The ratio
decidendum of the precedent case from a superior court did not control; "the
felt necessities of the time," not the carefully crafted opinion of a past judge,
controlled.
The common law has always drawn its strength from its rationality: it "is
the perfection of reason, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that
what is not reason is not law. '2' An irrational or immoral common law
decision is a wrong decision. Chief Judge Charles Breitel in a deservedly oft-
quoted passage wrote of common law decision-making:
The judicial process is based on reasoning and presupposes-all antirationalists to the
contrary notwithstanding-that its determinations are justified only when explained or
explainable in reason. No poll, no majority vote of the affected, no rule of expediency,
and certainly no confessedly subjective or idiosyncratic view justifies a judicial
determination. Emphatically, no claim of might, physical or political, justifies ajudicial
determination.
20 5
Rationality is contemporaneous, and draws on "the fountain of justice" and
"felt necessities" of its own time. If the reasons remain relevant, the precedent
governs; that is the power of stare decisis. The present judge may not decide
201. 254 F.2d 619 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
202. Id. at 621.
203. I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
204. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *70.
205. Charles Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 772 (1965).
20031
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
differently simply because she asseses values differently. Of course among
those exogenous grounds may well be, as Justice Souter wrote in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, an inertial resistance to change because of reliance,
adding "inequity to the cost of repudiation." 2" But that resistance to change
is less significant in those behavioral domains in which denizens do not seek
notice of the law before acting.2"7
What of the requirements of notice and our distaste for retroactivity? In
those areas in which we seek notice of and rely on the state of the law before
acting, statutes are, no doubt easier to use. The words of a statute themselves
have authority independently of the reasons for which they were chosen by the
legislature. To find and follow a common law decision requires one to take
some responsibility for determining the meaning of precedent in the light of
common decencies.2"' But in the natural home of the common law, those
manifold interactions for which ii would be absurd to seek legal guidance,
notice is no problem. The reasons for a common law judicial decision are
much more accessible to most people than the decision itself. The judge
draws on the same societal values in justification of a decision (and for criteria
of similarity with precedents) as the ordinary denizen uses for guidance in
206. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 854 (1992).
207. This makes a determination of the nature of ordinary behavior rather important to a decision,
as it should be. But we do get some curious judgments as a result. For example in Casey, Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter wrote: "[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail." Id.
at 856. Is that accurate? Is this empirically well informed? Determinedly supporting a death sentence,
Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[clonsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved .. " Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828 (1991) (citing Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. I 11, 116 (1965)). He goes on to argue that "the opposite
is true in cases involving procedural and evidentiary rules." Id. To support this proposition, he points out
that in the previous twenty terms the Court had "overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous
constitutional decisions." Id. Is that wise, equitable, or correct about the law of evidence? In Strother v.
Barr, 130 Eng. Rep. 1013, 1019 (C.P. 1828), C.J. Best wrote to the contrary that rules of evidence were "the
same in actions for injuries to the reversion as in high treason." Id. For that reason he presumed that we
should apply the evidentiary standards that are needed for high treason to all actions, and demanded that
they be certain because "uncertainty in the law of high treason would prevent any state from being free."
Id. Thus the Court could protect ordinary people from the excesses of a powerful government. Id.
208. When there has been justified reliance on prior decisions, courts have on occasion resorted to
the expedient of announcing a decision as prospective only. This may be theoretically dubious, akin to
legislating, but it is nevertheless effective. Thus, for example, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court faced the exploitation of an old decision, Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 299 (Mass. 1945), to subvert
a fundamental tenet of estate planning-a reliance domain-it made its decision changing the old rule
prospective only saying, "[wle announce for the future that, as to any inter vivos trust created or amended
after the date of this opinion, we shall no longer follow the rule announced in Kerwin v. Donaghy."
Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
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acting. Thus a landmark decision is not objectionably retroactive in society
itself; it should reflect the behavioral necessities and constraints of which the
parties are or should have been aware at the time of their contentious
interaction. Behave according to the demands of ordinary values and you
should never run afoul of the common law.
The standard model thus solves the problems of notice, reliability, and
adaptivity quite fittingly. But, one might ask, why does it select judicial
decisions as authority? Surely judges come to subject matter as relative
neophytes compared with specialist practitioners and academics; should not
the writings of experts count as more authoritative than cases on this theory?
We put great faith in judicial decisions, whether by a judge with expertise in
the subject area or not, because judges decide under great social and moral
pressure, under "decisional fire":2°9 before them are the parties whose wealth,
freedom, and sometimes lives are at stake. Deciding with immediate
consequences to fellow humans is importantly different from deciding
hypotheticals.2"' But that critical quality of decisional fire does not stretch
beyond the actual decision; it does not reach the other, future, and
hypothetical disputes between parties not present, or cases that might fall
under a purported rule. Whether this case counts as precedent for a future
decision is for that future judge to decide.21" '
But, it might be objected, this claim to empirical accuracy of the standard
theory, as against the enactment theory is overblown. We do resort to "rules
of cases," for example the "Rule in Shelley's Case"2"2 or the "Rule of Foakes
'n' Beer,"2 '3 and many more of their ilk. Under the declaratory theory, a case
was evidence of the law but not the law itself, yet they too used this locution
(and these two examples). Blackstone explained the usage as deriving from
custom exemplified in the opinions spoken from the bench and recorded by
reporters, such as himself:
[T]he maxims and customs, so collected, are of higher antiquity than memory or history
can reach: nothing being more difficult than to ascertain the precise beginning and first
209. Sir Matthew Hale gave this reason in the early 18th century, "[b]ecause they do Sedere pro
Tribunali." HALE, supra note 96, at 45.
210. This also supports treating decisions as precedent even when the reasons on which we hold them
to be so did not occur to the deciding judge.
211. Precisely contrary to Schauer, supra note 139, at 573 and the enactment theory, but consistent
with practice.
212. Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1581) (Shelley's Case); see also RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 312 cmt. a (1940) (citing Abel's Case, Y.B. 18 Edw. 2, 577 (1324)).
213. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884).
20031
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
spring of an ancient and long-established custom. Whence it is that in our law the
goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used time out of mind; or, in the
solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary.214
This explanation, if not its mode of expression, rings true today. Much may
change in society, and the law must adapt to it; but most of our interpersonal
conventions have remained remarkably stable; most nineteenth century
wrongs remain wrongs in the twenty-first century. It is not surprising that we
should have developed names for them, such as "battery" and "consideration"
and stable verbal accounts of them. It does no harm to call these "rules," even
if there is, and can be, no canonical verbal formulae for them. "The Rule of
Foakes 'n'Beer" simply names a regularity in legal thinking that has persisted
over hundreds of years,2"5 and persists in classrooms to this day, even if people
in commerce mostly ignore it. It shows stare decisis in action when the source
of reasons does not change in relevant respects.216 The principal risk of this
"rule of' talk is that students, lawyers, and judges will be induced not to
question or re-examine the underlying reasoning.27
A stronger objection to the standard theory flows from the reaction of
lower courts and legal advisors to the great and ubiquitous power of vertical
stare decisis. Legal actors in lower decision-making roles take the reasons and
verbal formula of higher courts as governing, be they dicta or not. Think, for
example, of the impact of footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.2" 8 It was merely an aside suggesting that instead of a presumption of
constitutionality, a stricter scrutiny would be given to laws affecting a discrete
and insular minority, but it "helped launch both a new substantive due process
and equal protection doctrine by which the Court would closely scrutinize
214. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *67.
215. It relied on Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1602), but Pinnel's Case never developed
the cachet of Foakes v. Beer. See 9 App. Cas. 605.
216. Sinclair, supra note 159, at 481-83.
217. Reliance as a basis for enforcing promises does serious damage to Foakes v. Beer. See 9 App.
Cas. 605. The Rule in Shelley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, and its predecessor, Abel's Case, Y.B. 18 Edw.
2, 577 (1324), is said to be defunct in the law of future interests.
218. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the 14th ....
[Tihose political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect discrete and insular minorities...
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
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laws affecting political and personal rights. 219 In courts this deference stems
from the need for efficiency and, perhaps, from judges' aversion to being
overruled on appeal; it can also lend weight from above to an opinion,
foreclosing criticism. For advisors, it simply makes pragmatic sense. On the
realist argument that the governing law is what the courts would decide should
we have to litigate, it is prudent to plan according to the expressed preferences
of the current (or recent) supreme court of the jurisdiction. This certainly has
the appearance of rule governed behavior, following authoritative words,
rather than rational analysis.
Yet this does not make those words from above into rules. Recent
opinions, even in their dicta, may be taken and followed by legal practitioners
as rules for their decisions. But that does not make them rules of law; it just
makes them commanding, and only to the limited population that knows about
them, little more than a selection of lawyers. This conception of common law
rules by vertical stare decisis is a conception of rules for lower court judges
and lawyers, and those who take and pay for their prospective advice. The
ordinary denizen of society, whose behavior is equally subject to legal
limitation, will have no notice of such so-called rules, and thus no duty to
comply. Rules of which only a limited elite can know are hardly to be counted
among our governing laws.22°
That, then, is the standard theory of common law and precedent. It lacks
the clarity and simplicity of the enactment theory. It requires a great deal
more explanation. It does not draw precise boundaries between the variations
in treatment of different types of behavior, especially on the spectrum between
reliance and non-reliance behaviors, between those we typically undertake
only on legal advice and those for which we never seek advice.22' For
decision-makers (as for students) it is considerably less secure than the
enactment theory: one cannot escape thinking, drawing on exogenous values
in legal reasoning. The other side of that coin is that the standard theory gives
opportunities to those determined to subvert the law: "If a court is intent upon
acting irresponsibly, it can do so with a published opinion just as well as
without one. The leeways of precedent and the fuzziness of the record almost
219. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 89-90 (1992). See Sinclair, supra note
159, at 490-92.
220. Id.
221. So following Wittgenstein, we might call it a "family resemblance" concept. LUDWIG
WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66 (1953). That law is a "family resemblance concept"
is argued by Roy Stone, Ratiocination Not Rationalization, 74 MIND 463, 478-80 (1965).
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always enable a court to make any decision appear reasonable.""22 But that
too is empirically accurate. The standard theory is the position taken or
implied by Judge Arnold in Anastasoff.
[W]e are not here creating some rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents. Cases
can be overruled. Sometimes they should be. On our Court, this function can be
performed by the en banc Court, but not by a single panel. If the reasoning of a case is
exposed as faulty, or if other exigent circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed.
When this occurs, however, there is a burden of justification. The precedent from which
we are departing should be stated, and our reasons for rejecting it should be made
convincingly clear. In this way, the law grows and changes, but it does so incrementally,
in response to the dictates of reason, and not because judges have simply changed their
minds.223
How does precedent on the standard theory accord with the prohibition
on citing unpublished decisions? Very poorly. On this theory, stare decisis
and common law decision-making are inextricably intertwined; ajudge cannot
make a decision without taking part in the common law precedent system.224
Denying precedential status is futile. If this is the understanding with which
we should now vest "judicial power" in Article 111 of the Constitution, then
Judge Arnold is correct: no-citation rules are unconstitutional.
C. Assessment
I once heard an interview with the great French mathematician Rene
Thom in which he said that "we are all realists when we do mathematics; it is
only when we talk about doing it that we become Platonists and formalists and
such like," or words to that effect. It is like that with the use of precedent in
law, whether by judges or attorneys or academics. Only in examinations and
course guide books do we tend to find enactment theories-the familiar
"IRAC" in which the "R" is for the rule. In our theories we should seek to
account for the data of actual practice: the more of that data, and the wider
the variety unified by the theory the better. What we are after is like a model
of the wisdom of the experienced judge or practitioner. But a theory of law
222. Martineau, supra note 12, at 132.
223. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904-05 (8th Cir. 2000).
224. "We concede, of course, that any decision is by definition a precedent, and that we cannot deny
litigants and the bar to urge upon us what we have previously done." Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State
Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Boggs & Brooks, supra note 11, at 17 ("To the
common lawyer, every decision of every court is a precedent.").
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should also be simple and perspicuous; after all, many people need to use it
in their daily work, and without complex calculation.
The enactment theory failed to account for judicial power, practice, and
its limitations. It confused judging with the other great branch of legal
decision-making, legislation, and it failed adequately to meet the requirements
of notice and prospectivity. But it did have the virtues of simplicity and
psychological security. The standard theory cannot match it in comfort and
security; but it does account for the facts of legal practice and judicial
decision-making practice, and properly accounts for notice and the avoidance
of retroactivity in variegated social domains. It also accounts better for our
law's adaptation to changing circumstances, and for how it achieves that
adaptation without greatly compromising the stability society requires.
But that assessment leads rather uncompromisingly to the conclusion that
no-citation rules are unconstitutional, a conclusion it would be useful to avoid,
or to escape in some fashion.
11. CONCLUSION: A PLAUSIBLE SOLUTION
William Mills, in a survey of the accessibility of unpublished opinions,
concludes that,
[they] have become ever more accessible in both electronic and print sources. They can
be easily cited using current citation forms. And the echo of constitutional authority from
the Anastasoff panel opinion continues to resonate. All these factors make it likely that
courts will be under pressure to recognize the value of unpublished opinions as
precedent.225
Unpublished decisions are going to be sought out and used by the legal
profession. This is inescapable. No Draconian contempt measures will
prevent it, although enforcement of no-citation rules will prevent actual
citation. Taking guidance from unpublished opinions and referring to them
in opinion letters, for example, is beyond the scope of any no-citation rule.
Suitable quotes without acknowledgment of their sources may be quite
effective in a brief, yet still avoid the prohibition. The present system may
encourage deception in briefs, but it does little in reality, especially not the
reality of prospective decision-making, planning, and advising. Nevertheless,
with no indication of a decrease in appeals or an increase in the federal
225. Mills, supra note 22, at 22-23.
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appellate bench, we can only expect the non-publication practice to continue.
What, then, should be done about the dilemma of no-citation rules?
They should be repealed, and the non-publication practice should be
abandoned. But in their place, publication of minimal opinions would turn the
same trick. Brooks writes, "one of the primary justifications for not
publishing certain opinions is that they can be decided 'in a few sentences
with citations to two or three key cases."' 22 6 If this is true, if a decision is
truly routine, ploughs no new ground, draws no new distinctions, creates no
new law, but merely follows in the steps of established precedent,227 then
adequate articulation is surely provided by citing that precedent: "Affirmed
on the basis of... cite.., and.., cite; cf... cite.... ." For example, the full
text of a Supreme Court decision reads, "Certiorari granted and judgment
reversed. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). Reported below:
769 F.2d 532.," 228 For a truly routine decision, publishing such minimal
announcements of that routine should satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution under the standard theory. However, if the decision is not
routine, if it creates new law or changes old law, then it should be published.
This solution would meet the basic problem of the overburden on our
federal appellate judiciary. At present, many courts, including circuit courts
of appeals, require the parties to be provided with written dispositions of their
cases. 229 A mere "Judgment affirmed," as occurs in some memorandum
decisions, should hardly do. 230 But the minimal form opinion proposed, with
its secure and declared grounds, should be adequate for this requirement and
for the parties. It is no greater burden than judges bear under the present non-
publication practice and no-citation rules.
Nor would this solution impose an excessive burden on researchers.2
What would be the point of finding and citing all the subsequent one line
progeny of a case? It could surely do little more than annoy judges and clerks
226. Brooks, supra note 24, at 260 (quoting Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 43).
227. "[Clases whose outcomes are clearly dictated by existing precedent are often thought to be
appropriate candidates for non-publication." Boggs & Brooks, supra note 11, at 19.
228. County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936 (1985).
229. See, e.g., Ninth Cir. R. 21(a) requiring a "written reasoned disposition."
230. Gardner, supra note 26, at 1225 ("There may be room for debate about how much ink should
be spilled in order to reach the threshold of articulated reason contemplated... [but] it is surely violated
by... the panel's written disposition consist[ing] of just eight words: 'The district court's judgment of
conviction is affirmed."').
231. Thus alleviating the potential problem of free citation as authority Mills aptly writes "would
result in researchers being held to unattainably high standards in retrieving fugitive documents." Mills,
supra note 22.
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reading briefs. Besides, it is not at all clear what having many progeny
indicates about a decision. A great, clear, and decisive landmark case might
generate cites only in law reviews, all others being so convinced that they do
not bother to litigate the question or accept summary judgment. On that
reasoning, generating many subsequent citations should indicate frailty of
reasoning rather than conviction.232 However that argument goes, publishing
minimal accounts of routine decisions would leave a data trail for academic
researchers interested in counting coup. On the other hand, publishing all
such opinions would give no advantages in litigation to those able to finance
unlimited research.
This solution may not satisfy the enactment theorists. For example,
"[r]ules granting precedential value to summary dispositions are based on a
flawed premise-that the precedential value of a decision can be determined
when only the result and not the reasoning is known" because the case will
not establish "a precedent for a particular proposition., 23   But, as I have
argued above, this is failing only to satisfy the requirements of a misguided
theory. On the standard theory it is not problematic.
The status quo is not satisfactory either practically or jurisprudentially;
but absent unlimited judicial time, publishing capacity, and researcher time
and finance-absences which neither will nor should be
alleviated-something of its kind will continue. Publication of minimal
opinions listing only a brief citation trail may not be a perfect solution to the
problem, 234 but it avoids constitutional limitations, and would be as effective
as current practice in alleviating the overburden on our federal appellate
judges. And it may be the course least likely to annoy the critics.
232. When those subject to the court's decision seem not to hear, as for example when the Sixth
Circuit in at least six cases "vacated NLRB decisions that found nurses not to be supervisors," Boggs &
Brooks, supra note 11, at 19 n.12 (quoting Mid. Am. Cure Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 640-41 (6th
Cir. 1993)), simply citing the precedent overlooked may be the more instructive course. Economically
oriented theorists have argued that the common law is efficient ("works itself pure"?) because inefficient
rules will be appealed by adversely affected parties until changed. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common
Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection
of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). They may have a point. But the efficiency they would
achieve is not societal, but rather for the rich and powerful and well coordinated, who can afford to keep
fighting. Think, for example, of litigation over check collection procedures.
233. Dragich, supra note 12, at 793.
234. Most obviously, it depends on the judgment of the panel that the case is indeed easy. As
unpublished decisions have been reversed by the Supreme Court, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980);
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); we know that as an empirical matter, such
judgments are less than 100% perfect. See Boggs & Brooks, supra note 11, at 20-21 (arguing that relying
on judgments of "easy cases" is "self-evidently wrong for both empirical and theoretical reasons").
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